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INTRODUCTION
Counterintuitive claims, by their very nature, are spectacular
high-wire acts. They seek to defend the implausible, the opposite of
what our intuitions treat as obvious. To prove a counterintuitive
hypothesis is profoundly unsettling to received wisdom. We come to
see the familiar in a new light.
Heather Gerken’s 2005 article, Second-Order Diversity, deftly
accomplished just such a counterintuition about the jury.1 Gerken
began with what most persons would consider a troubling feature
of both the civil and criminal jury systems—that different juries,
composed in different ways, reach different verdicts in cases that
seem similar.2 Ideally, we want like cases treated alike; we do not
want verdicts to sway with the luck of the draw as to who is on the
jury. We value coherence and consistency, predictability and
uniformity as necessary to the rule of law.3 But Gerken turned
accepted wisdom on its head and set out to show that variation
among juries was, within limits, a virtue, not a vice of the jury
system—indeed the crucial virtue that makes juries a check on the
inegalitarian tendencies of majority rule in a democracy.4 Variation
in the racial composition of juries from one case to the next, for in-
stance, accomplishes for law what variation in the racial composition
1. Heather K. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1099 (2005). 
2. For criticisms of inconsistency in civil jury verdicts, see David Schkade et al.,
Deliberating About Dollars: The Severity Shift, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1139, 1168 (2000)
(“Unpredictability is a serious problem for jury verdicts, partly because it ensures that the
similarly situated will often not be treated similarly.”); see also Catharine Pierce Wells, Tort
Law as Corrective Justice: A Pragmatic Justification for Jury Adjudication, 88 MICH. L. REV.
2348, 2352, 2391 (1990) (explaining how critics of the tort jury lament a “decentralized”
system that “undercompensates some victims while overcompensating others”). For parallel
criticisms of inconsistent criminal verdicts, see Shamena Anwar et al., The Impact of Jury
Race in Criminal Trials, 127 Q.J. ECON. 1017, 1049 (2012) (explaining that the application
of criminal justice in Florida is “highly uneven,” with even small changes in the composition
of the jury having a large impact on conviction rates). 
3. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 587 (1996) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[T]he
uniform general treatment of similarly situated persons ... is the essence of law itself.”). 
4. Gerken, supra note 1, at 1102 (“[D]emocracy sometimes benefits from having
decisionmaking bodies that ... encompass a wide range of compositions.”); id. at 1166 (“[W]e
ought to value the fact that different juries will render different verdicts in similar cases.”).
But cf. id. at 1105 (acknowledging the costs of variation and loss of uniformity). 
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of districts does for elections: the latter speaks to the democratic
fairness of empowering minorities to elect their preferred candidate
in some districts and the former, by analogy, to achieving their
preferred verdict in some cases. 
In this Article, I review both the empirical literature and the
democratic philosophy that led Gerken to her embrace of the
benefits of variation. I will argue that her counterintuition fails in
the end to keep the jury’s political and legal functions from flying
apart. And I will defend precisely what Gerken rejects—the
contribution that diversity on individual juries makes to closing the
gap on bodies that are expected both to represent the community
and yet do impartial justice. 
I. FIRST-ORDER VERSUS SECOND-ORDER DIVERSITY
Gerken’s argument begins by distinguishing two concepts of
diversity. First-order diversity is a norm or ideal that seeks to make
each jury a mirror or microcosm of the community from which it is
drawn. In other words, the goal is diversity or representation within
each jury.5 By contrast, second-order diversity seeks “variation
among decisionmaking bodies.”6 What is crucial is not that any
single jury be representative of the community but that, in the
aggregate, the very differences in jury composition from case to case
rotate power and participation among the full, heterogeneous range
of groups in the population.
The distinction between first- and second-order diversity is both
a descriptive and a normative claim. Descriptively, random selection
is not a procedure designed to guarantee diversity within particular
juries.7 To take Gerken’s example, in a state with a 35% African-
American and 65% white population, a system designed to achieve
first-order diversity would mean that three to four persons on every
jury would be African-American. By contrast, random selection will
generate a series of results along a spectrum. About a third of juries
5. First-order diversity is “the hope that democratic bodies will someday mirror the
polity.” Id. at 1102. In this Article, I will follow Gerken’s terminology, but, strictly speaking,
a jury that is a mirror of the community need not be diverse. In a homogeneous county, a
homogeneous jury might very well be representative of the population. 
6. Id. at 1102 (emphasis added).
7. Id. at 1112.
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will have five to six African-Americans. Roughly 15%, however, will
have two or fewer African-Americans, whereas about another 8%
will have seven or more. Thus, what random selection produces is
second-order diversity—a variation in jury membership from one
case to another, with different groups predominating at different
times.8
Whereas second-order diversity is a theory that explains the
pattern ideally made by random selection, a theory of first-order
diversity has less descriptive power. The constitutional and
statutory principles governing jury selection only require that the
initial pool of persons from which potential jurors are randomly
drawn be a fair cross section of the community. The Supreme Court
has emphatically rejected arguments that particular juries must
achieve or maintain mirror-image representation.9 Indeed, equal
protection jurisprudence prohibits courts from using race-conscious
methods to achieve cross-sectional jury representation.10 The fact
that the law does not apply the norm of mirror-image representation
to individual juries casts doubt, for Gerken, on whether first-order
diversity is really the theory implicit in existing selection methods.
Several strategies could potentially close this gap between theory
and practice during jury selection. One approach is to double down
8. Id. at 1112-13. Gerken acknowledges that these numbers only hold under ideal
conditions. Id. at 1112 n.17. In practice, many jurisdictions empanel individual juries far less
representative than random selection should achieve. For instance, in Gerken’s hypothetical
example, nearly half (44.2%) of juries should have three or four African-American members.
Id. at 1113 tbl.1. But this expectation is defeated when practical problems keep random
selection from working as intended. See, e.g., Mary R. Rose & Jeffrey B. Abramson, Data,
Race, and the Courts: Some Lessons on Empiricism from Jury Representation Cases, 2011
MICH. ST. L. REV. 911, 916-54 (studying federal pools where initial sources lists are not
representative of the community and where problems with summonsing jurors further dilutes
representation on actual juries). It is important to keep in mind that, in actual jury pools,
much of the departure from first-order diversity is avoidable and not the inevitable statistical
consequence of relying on random selection. Id.
9. See, e.g., Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 478-84 (1990); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S.
522, 538 (1975).
10. See, e.g., United States v. Ovalle, 136 F.3d 1092, 1106 (6th Cir. 1998) (disapproving
of a trial judge’s attempt to achieve representativeness on the qualified jury list by randomly
striking a specified number of “white or other” potential jurors from the list). Equal protection
also prohibits litigants from using peremptory challenges to alter a jury’s racial composition.
See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 630 (1991) (“[I]f race stereotypes are
the price for acceptance of a jury panel as fair, the price is too high to meet the standard of
the Constitution.”). 
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on first-order diversity as the right theory and argue for extending
the fair cross section requirement to actual juries. That extension
can be rigid, as it is when scholars argue that quotas are
necessary.11 Or it can be more relaxed, as it is with proposals to give
litigants some choice in “affirmatively select[ing] a jury”12 or with
schemes of weighted or stratified selection that only seek to solve
predictable problems that keep random selection from working as
intended.13 These remedies share a theoretical commitment to
achieving demographic diversity within the jury even though
differing considerably on how much they concede to practical
difficulties in achieving the goal.14
11. See, e.g., JON ELSTER, SECURITIES AGAINST MISRULE: JURIES, ASSEMBLIES, ELECTIONS
279 (2013) (noting without approving that juries in Norway must have approximately equal
numbers of men and women); Albert W. Alschuler, Racial Quotas and the Jury, 44 DUKE L.J.
704, 707-11 (1995) (expressing approval of the proposal to use quotas to fill some seats on the
Hennepin County, Minnesota grand jury); Nancy J. King, Postconviction Review of Jury
Discrimination: Measuring the Effects of Juror Race on Jury Decisions, 92 MICH. L. REV. 63,
106 (1993) (citing to advocates of quotas); Note, The Case for Black Juries, 79 YALE L.J. 531
(1970). 
12. Deborah Ramirez, Affirmative Jury Selection: A Proposal to Advance Both the
Deliberative Ideal and Jury Diversity, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 161, 171-76 (suggesting that
parties be given a fixed number of choices as to who is seated on the final jury); see also
William Bowers et al., Crossing Racial Boundaries: A Closer Look at the Roots of Racial Bias
in Capital Sentencing When the Defendant Is Black and the Victim Is White, 53 DEPAUL L.
REV. 1497, 1534-35 (2004) (partly advocating the right to select one or more peers on a capital
jury).
13. See, e.g., United States v. Green, 389 F. Supp. 2d 29, 69-79 (D. Mass.) (weighting the
mailing of summonses so as to oversample poor and minority zip codes where rates of
deliverable mail or responses to summonses are historically low), rev’d on other grounds, sub
nom. In re United States, 426 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005); see also Leslie Ellis & Shari Seidman
Diamond, Race, Diversity, and Jury Composition: Battering and Bolstering Jury Legitimacy,
78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1033, 1053-58 (2003) (suggesting methods of stratified or weighted
summonsing).
14. Quotas run into the practical problem that there are too many dimensions to diversity
to be able to come up with an appropriate measurement that could guide what groups to
include and which ones to exclude. ELSTER, supra note 11, at 280. For this reason, even many
proponents of first-order diversity reject quotas. See King, supra note 11, at 106 (disapproving
of attempts to “statistically engineer[ ] racial heterogeneity” and conceding that a gap between
theory and practice will always remain); Nancy S. Marder, Juries, Justice & Multiculturalism,
75 S. CAL. L. REV. 659, 703 (2002). To try to close that gap entirely might have more costs
than benefits to the legitimacy of jury verdicts, if seated jurors understand themselves as
there to represent their group identity. See JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY 140 (1994);
Ramirez, supra note 12, at 167-69; see also Marder, supra at 703 (“For courts to decide which
characteristics should be represented would suggest jury manipulation.”).
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The other strategy for healing the breach between theory and
practice—Gerken’s strategy—is to jettison the very ideal of balanced
demographic representation on individual juries. Even if we were to
ever more perfectly practice the theory of descriptive
representation,15 we would still, according to Gerken, reach the
democratic dead-end to which such “integrationist” norms lead. To
be sure, cross-sectional juries bring minorities to the table and grant
them the influence that comes from being present in small numbers.
But influence is one thing—power is another; and Gerken norma-
tively prefers second-order diversity to first-order diversity precisely
because the former statistically leads to jury trials in which
minorities are in control as the dominant numerical faction.16 
Second-order diversity “turns the tables” on the majority by
accomplishing for the jury system what the creation of majority-
minority districts does for elections: space for minorities to “exert
the type of power usually reserved for the majority.”17 Gerken refers
to such results as “disaggregated democracy.”18 Instead of a model
of democracy in which we aggregate individual preferences in ways
that repeatedly empower the majority, disaggregated democracy
creates topsy-turvy situations “where members of the majority
experience what it is like to be deprived of the comfort—and
power—associated with their majority status.”19
One might pause here—Gerken does pause—to consider whether
the unanimous verdict requirement gives minorities more than idle
presence on cross-sectional juries. After all, the rule would seem to
empower even one or two jurors to hold out against the larger
15. See Gerken, supra note 1, at 1116 n.32, for a distinction between hesitancies about
first-order diversity that are based on merely “practical” as opposed to normative difficulties.
16. In Gerken’s hypothetical jurisdiction that is 35% African-American and 65% white,
random selection in theory will lead to 8.3% of the juries being majority African-American.
Id. at 1113 tbl.1.
17. Id. at 1104, 1126 (explaining that second-order diversity gives minorities power to
decide on a few juries, whereas first-order diversity gives them weak influence on many
juries). 
18. Id. at 1108-09.
19. Id. at 1104. Gerken mentions a number of benefits to second-order diversity, but there
are two major ones: (1) the power to control the verdict decision and (2) to interpret the law
according to one’s norms. Id. at 1124-32. Gerken also mentions participatory experiences that
flow to minority groups, “regardless of the verdict,” that inhere simply in participating not
just as outsiders but as persons with “the dignity to decide” or to “stand[] for” or act on behalf
of “the whole.” Id. at 1142-52.
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majority faction.20 Gerken, however, follows in the tradition of
Kalven and Zeisel in debunking deliberation as more mythic than
real—a political rather than reasoned process of exerting “strong
social-psychological” pressure on outliers to succumb to the will of
an initial majority.21 Thus, even under the unanimous verdict rule,
“individuals who occupy the ends of the democratic spectrum are
unlikely to prevail,” as the scales of justice tip in the direction of the
median juror viewpoint.22
Many commentators consider the move toward the middle to be
one of the virtues of jury trials because it minimizes the dangers to
any one litigant of drawing an outlier jury.23 Gerken, however,
implores us to reconsider our intuitions. The problem is that cross-
sectional jury design is a blueprint for permitting the same majority
faction to “decide things all the time,” with only that sort of
compromise necessary to reach the “tipping point” beyond which
remaining jurors are too few to maintain a hold-out.24 From the
point of view of basic democratic fairness, Gerken argues, we should
be concerned with a process in which the minority is granted seats
at the table, only to lose.25
In what follows, I will argue that the negative case against first-
order diversity and the positive case for second-order diversity are
20. However, for a review of many studies showing that “a minority of one rarely
influences a jury’s verdict or succeeds in hanging a jury,” see King, supra note 11, at 98
(internal quotation marks omitted). But see infra text accompanying notes 102-06 for data
that even one juror can have an impact on the life versus death decision made by capital
sentencing juries.
21. Gerken, supra note 1, at 1125.
22. Id. at 1125-26.
23. See, e.g., Edward P. Schwartz & Warren F. Schwartz, The Challenge of Peremptory
Challenges, 12 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 325, 355-56 (1996).
24. Gerken, supra note 1, at 1124-25. Gerken does see cross-section design as permitting
minorities to “trim” the majority sail and thereby soften the preferred verdict. Id. at 1127. But
precisely because minorities only achieve influence by moving to the middle, id. at 1125, we
lose what second-order diversity gives us: a richer democratic portrait of the range of views
in the community, id. at 1161.
25. Gerken does not assume that any particular group identity is going to prove salient
or divisive on juries or even that fissures among groups are bound to occur or hold. Id. at
1173. She is not concerned when a group finds itself in the minority only now and again
because there is no threat of subordination simply from losing. When individuals sharing
some group identity are “trapped in a more stable political dynamic and consistently are in
the political minority on some meaningful subset of issues,” then Gerken sees a need for a
democratic design adequate to undo the pattern of domination and subordination. Id. at 1110. 
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not as strong as Gerken would have it. The negative case depends
on a radical dismissal of the contributions diversity makes to the
transformative power of reasoned argument and collective delibera-
tion on a particular jury—a dismissal called into question by a
growing body of empirical research I review in Part I.26 Gerken is
right that we have to live with departures from representation that
random selection procedures create. However, the evidence I review
suggests that we should be doing much more within the bounds of
random selection to pursue the good of deliberation on first-order
diverse juries.
Gerken’s positive case for second-order diversity rests on a
provocative understanding of what the political functions of the jury
are, or ought to be. The issue is not whether the jury is a “political”
or “democratic” institution—any decision-making body that drafts
ordinary people into the daily business of self-government is
obviously an example of democratic politics. But behaving politically
on a jury, in the sense of seeking partisan control, vastly differs
from behaving politically, in the sense of arguing toward a collective
judgment. Gerken correctly points to my previous writings as
critical of the first view for importing notions of representation that,
however proper in legislative bodies, do not fit the paramount
obligations of jurors to protect the rights of litigants.27 I have
argued, and will argue here, for the alternative view of the jury as
a participatory political and democratic body in the deliberative
sense.28
26. I do not argue that diversity is sufficient to protect juries from the many pitfalls that
group deliberation is subject to—only that we have good reasons to believe heterogeneous
bodies avoid some of the biases that homogeneous panels display. For some of deliberation’s
perils, see infra Part II.B. Diversity might bring its own perils to a group, for instance, by
exacerbating group conflict. See Marder, supra note 14, at 687-88 (hypothesizing that diver-
sity might breed conflict, but showing in a mock jury trial that gender diversity actually
lowered hostility and increased satisfaction). 
27. Compare Gerken, supra note 1, at 1136-37 n.97, with ABRAMSON, supra note 14, at
125.
28. Although Gerken distinguishes first- and second-order diversity, her argument
depends on drawing a similarity as well. However composed, juries are said to render verdicts
less by modeling deliberation and more by marshaling politics. Gerken, supra note 1, at 1152
n.144. Cross-sectional juries politically empower those in the middle. Id. at 1125. Second-
order diversity gives us verdicts farther to the ends of the spectrum. Id. at 1126. My major
concern is Gerken’s underlying rejection of the deliberative ideal.
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At least rhetorically, Gerken’s landmark article is replete with
phrases that suggest the jury is political in the full representative
sense.29 She describes and defends second-order diversity as
permitting groups to take turns exercising “control” on juries, and
she analogizes that control to the electoral power minorities achieve
through the creation of majority-minority districts. Such analogies
flatten the differences between voting behavior and jury behavior
that explain why we entrust ordinary persons with the power of
responsible judgment in legal cases in the first place.30 
My concern is that Gerken’s views on the politics of juries, though
meant to support equal participation for minorities, will end up
hurting the very groups she seeks to empower. Any comprehensive
theory of the jury has to show how the jury as a political institution,
empowering ordinary persons with the power of judgment, goes
together with the jury as a legal institution, obliged to be “locally
objective” in a particular case.31 Gerken’s theory of second-order
diversity cannot build the necessary bridge between the adjudicative
and political functions of the jury; in fact, as I will try to show, she
mostly wants to tear that bridge down by arguing that all jury
decision making is political in a stark sense. 
Gerken does not specifically address whether the political
functions of the civil and criminal jury differ in important respects.
But I take her to be arguing for a unified theory in which both civil
and criminal juries empower a rotating set of persons to participate
in “‘edit[ing]’ the law,”32 rather than applying it mechanically. When
29. In one particularly dramatic illustration of her views, she writes:
I use the term “collective” rather than “deliberative” in order to leave room for
the notion that the political act in which juries are engaged is properly
democratic even if it involves old-fashioned foot-stamping, even if the
discussions are not framed as a means to achieve the common good but involve
logrolling and other hallmarks of interest-based bargaining, even if the jurors
understand themselves to be “representing” the interests of their communities
rather than the common good, or even if they cannot achieve consensus and
must resort to voting.... In my view, juries need not be deliberative ... in order
to be democratic.
Id. at 1152 n.144.
30. King, supra note 11, at 113 (“[J]urors may ... be just as susceptible as legislators to
signals that they should act as racial representatives.”). 
31. I borrow the phrase “locally objective” from Wells, supra note 2, at 2409. For an
explanation of the concept of local objectivity, see infra text accompanying notes 228-33.
32. Gerken, supra note 1, at 1127.
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it comes to that editing, the tort jury actually enjoys “unusually
high” power33 to bring community norms to bear on the interpreta-
tion of what the law means by “reasonable conduct” or “ordinary
care.”34 Because this editing will reflect the norms and experiences
of those sitting at the editor’s desk, debates about jury composition
are presumably as important in the civil jury context as they are in
the criminal. I will turn to specific issues about the civil jury in Part
III.
II. THE NEGATIVE CASE AGAINST FIRST-ORDER DIVERSITY
Many scholars criticize the theory of the cross-sectional jury for
assuming we get what we want on juries—representation of
substantively different views—merely by representing demographi-
cally different groups.35 Such an equation of demographic balance
(the jury “looks like” the community) with substantive representa-
tion (the jury “pools” together multiple perspectives), these critics
argue, rests on a false and stigmatizing essentialism—a form of
stereotyping that sees group identity as permanent and static,
which treats every member, say of a racial or gender group, as
having the same views and values as every other member of that
group.36
33. Jason M. Solomon, The Political Puzzle of the Civil Jury, 61 EMORY L.J. 1331, 1335
(2012). One historical example of the civil jury’s political power was its resistance to abiding
by the legal standard that made contributory negligence a complete bar to a plaintiff ’s
recovery. Lars Noah, Civil Jury Nullification, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1601, 1649 (2001). In time, this
civil jury resistance led to legislative change that “humanize[d] the law.” Stephan Landsman,
The Civil Jury in America: Scenes from an Unappreciated History, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 579, 605
(1993).
34. Noah, supra note 33, at 1649 (“Unlike criminal statutes that must proscribe
misconduct with great specificity, negligence claims often invite juries to define the standard
of reasonable conduct under the circumstances.”); see also Wells, supra note 2, at 2388
(explaining that in negligence cases, “the line between the judge’s sphere and the jury’s does
not separate an area of normative, law-like matters from one that is purely factual....
[N]egligence cases[ ] present ‘mixed’ questions that invest the jury with broad discretion to
decide the ultimate normative questions under dispute.”).
35. See, e.g., Richard Re, Re-justifying the Fair Cross-Sectional Requirement: Equal
Representation and Enfranchisement in the American Criminal Jury, 116 YALE L.J. 1568,
1580-81 (2007). 
36. Id. at 1573. For distinctions among theories of representation, see HANNA FENICHEL
PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION (1967).
750 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:739
In large part, Gerken agrees with this critique of essentialism and
treats group identities as fluid, open-ended, and overlapping.37 She
is far from assuming that individuals are fungible commodities or
that members of a minority reliably vote together or share the same
perspectives.38 She is at pains to agree that we frequently do not
know in advance what “axis of difference,” if any, will emerge on a
given jury.39 Nonetheless, Gerken acknowledges holding what we
might call a “weak” assumption about group difference: “[my]
assumption here is simply that some categories will be salient to the
political process—sufficient grounds for dividing the polity on a
regular basis—even if the precise boundaries of these divisions are
either porous or contingent.”40 
So Gerken’s case against first-order diversity comes down to this:
if and when fissures crack open and strand a minority time and
again on the losing side, the cross-sectional jury—even were we to
practice it perfectly—would not deliver much democratic aid across
the majority/minority fault line.41 Minority power on cross-sectional
juries is diluted in ways that parallel the dilution of minority voting
strength in at-large elections.42 
But is the influence minorities can exercise during jury delibera-
tions as weak or soft as Gerken makes it out to be? 
A. Predeliberation
To know whether deliberation on diverse groups brings any
benefits, we first need to know something about the influence of
group identity on individual jurors prior to deliberation. I will
concentrate on race because this is the paradigmatic case of
37. Gerken, supra note 1, at 1110 (explaining that identity can be playful).
38. Id. at 1159.
39. Id. In line with the parallels that Gerken draws between electoral districts and trial
juries, she frequently uses the term “minority” in a numerical rather than a demographic
sense. Id. at 1109. One of her reasons for preferring second-order diverse designs for the jury
is that we get to observe whether variations in verdict correlate with variations in jury
composition. Id. at 1160-61.
40. Id. at 1110. Gerken goes on to specify race as one category that is demonstrably
salient in American politics, notwithstanding the fluid nature of many persons’ racial
identities. Id.
41. Id. at 1187.
42. Id.
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domination/subordination that second-order diversity sets out to
cure.43 Although most of the studies below come from criminal cases,
studies suggest that attorneys in civil cases make the same
assumptions about the relevance of race during jury selection as
attorneys do in criminal trials.44 
It used to be said that even race was a poor predictor of an
individual’s initial verdict preference.45 But carefully done recent
research—principally by social psychologists Samuel Sommers and
43. Apart from race, the empirical literature on the influence of background
characteristics of individual jurors (for instance, gender, age, income, and educational level)
offers mixed results. In the civil area, some researchers report that “background
characteristics show only a modest association with verdict preferences” and that “the
strongest predictors of jury damage awards are characteristics of the case rather than
attributes of the jurors.” Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Juror Judgments About Liability and
Damages: Sources of Variability and Ways to Increase Consistency, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 301,
301, 306 (1998). Others have argued for the important influence of factors such as a juror’s
political ideology or cultural profile. See Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to
Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 861-62
(2009). On the criminal side, Eisenberg, Garvey, and Wells found that age, gender, and socio-
economic status did not correlate with jurors’ first votes on the death penalty, even when race
did. Theodore Eisenberg et al., Forecasting Life and Death: Juror Race, Religion, and Attitude
Toward the Death Penalty, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 277, 296, 307 (2001). At least older studies of
rape trials showed the influence of gender on a juror’s predilections. See, e.g., Denis Chimaeze
E. Ugwuegbu, Racial and Evidential Factors in Juror Attribution of Legal Responsibility, 15
J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 133, 141 (1979). One scholar summarizes the data on the
influence of the personal characteristics of jurors on their initial verdict preferences as “less
[than] clear-cut and ... consistent.” Samuel R. Sommers, Race and the Decision Making of
Juries, 12 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 171, 172 (2007).
44. See Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Achieving Diversity on the Jury: Jury Size and the
Peremptory Challenge, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 425, 441 (2009) (stating that the “strong
effect of being black on defense challenges was more pronounced for black males than for
black females” in civil trials); see also John Clark et al., Five Factor Model Personality Traits,
Jury Selection, and Case Outcomes in Criminal and Civil Cases, 34 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 641,
647 tbl.1 (2007) (showing that in a sample of 17 civil trials, 12% of the jurors excused by the
plaintiff were black, whereas 24% of the jurors excused by the defense were black). Although
these studies show that peremptory challenges are motivated by countervailing assumptions
by plaintiffs and defendants about the relevance of race to an individual’s attitudes, they do
not show that peremptory challenges change the composition of jury pools in the aggregate,
even if they have discrete effects on the ability of an individual to serve on a particular jury.
See Mary R. Rose, Access to Juries: Some Puzzles Regarding Race and Jury Participation, in
ACCESS TO JUSTICE 119, 123 (Rebecca L. Sandefur ed., 2009). 
45. See Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, How Much Do We Really Know About
Race and Juries?: A Review of Social Science Theory and Research, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 997,
1016-17 n.73 (2003) (“For many years, the consensus among mock jury researchers was that
little if any consistent correlation existed between juror race and verdict preference.” (citing
REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY 121-23 (1983)). 
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Phoebe Ellsworth—shows that race does correlate with starting
views in many but by no means all types of cases.46 Sommers and
Ellsworth gave mock jurors a written summary of an interracial
battery trial in which one member of a high school basketball team
was accused of attacking another player who replaced him in the
starting line-up.47 Half of the mock jurors read a transcript of a case
about a white defendant and black victim; the other half read the
same transcript but with a black defendant and white victim.48
Although every mock juror therefore knew the race of the defendant
and victim, half of them read a so-called “race-salient version” of the
case in which a defense witness mentions that the defendant was
one of only two white (or black) players on the team and had been
the subject of racial remarks from many of his black (or white)
teammates.49 The other mock jurors read a summary in which no
testimony drew attention to any issue of race.50 
Sommers and Ellsworth found that, in the non-race salient case,
individual white jurors showed a greater willingness to convict black
as opposed to white defendants, rating the prosecution’s case as
stronger against black defendants despite the fact that the evidence
was the same.51 However, this racial effect disappeared or waned in
the race-salient variant.52 Consistent with previous findings,53 the
researchers theorized that the most likely explanation for this
difference between race-salient and race-neutral cases was that
white jurors, socialized to accept egalitarian norms, were on their
own best behavior when the case material alerted them to the
46. Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, White Juror Bias: An Investigation of
Prejudice Against Black Defendants in the American Courtroom, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L.
201, 217, 220 (2001). For a summary of other studies on the influence of race on
predeliberation preferences of individual mock jurors, see Sommers, supra note 43, at 172-79. 
47. Sommers & Ellsworth, supra note 46, at 214-16.
48. Id. at 214.
49. Id. at 214-15.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 217-19.
52. Id. at 217.
53. Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Race in the Courtroom: Perceptions of
Guilt and Dispositional Attributions, 26 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1367, 1370-71,
1373 (2000). This case study, based on an altercation between an interracial couple, reached
similar results, with similar explanations. However, due to concerns that there might be bias
factors special to how jurors view interracial couples, they went on to a second study
summarized in the text above. 
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possibility of racial bias.54 By contrast, no such check kept implicit
racial bias from seeping into how white jurors heard the evidence in
the so-called garden-variety cases.55 In other studies, implicit racial
bias has been found to “affect the way ... [white] jurors encode, store,
and recall relevant case facts.”56 
Less research has been done into the attitudes of potential
minority jurors,57 but the evidence supports findings that African-
American jurors exhibit a “same-race leniency” in cases involving
African-American defendants.58 For instance, when white and black
prospective jurors were asked to respond to statements such as “The
race of a defendant affects the treatment s/he receives in the legal
system,” blacks were far more likely to agree.59 Given these differing
perspectives on the fairness of the criminal justice system, it is
hardly surprisingly to find that, on first ballots in mock studies,
individual African-American mock jurors “gave lower guilt ratings,
shorter sentence recommendations, and more positive personality
evaluations” to black as opposed to white defendants.60 These
findings hold true whether or not the trial was race-relevant,
indicating that African Americans have less “politically correct”
concerns than whites do when it comes to showing some in-group
preference.61 
54. Id. at 1370 (arguing that racial content of the trial activated a “motivation to appear
nonprejudiced”).
55. Sommers & Ellsworth, supra note 46, at 212.
56. Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking, and
Misremembering, 57 DUKE L.J. 345, 345 (2007). 
57. See Sommers, supra note 43, at 177-78 (noting a “scarcity of studies examining the
decision making of non-White jurors” and the relative lack of attention to other groups,
including Hispanics).
58. Id. at 178.
59. Sommers & Ellsworth, supra note 45, at 1020; see also Jordan Abshire & Brian H.
Bornstein, Juror Sensitivity to the Cross-Race Effect, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 471, 473 (2003)
(citing to a study showing that “76% of Black participants believed the police treated Blacks
differently from Whites, compared to 51% of White participants”).
60. Sommers & Ellsworth, supra note 45, at 1020. However, one archival study of 300
criminal cases from four jurisdictions disputes the existence of any general correlation
between race and a juror’s vote on first ballots and finds the correlation to hold true in its
sample only for the votes of African-American jurors in drug cases tried in the District of
Columbia involving minority defendants. See Stephen P. Garvey et al., Juror First Votes in
Criminal Trials, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 371, 373, 397-98 (2004).
61. Sommers & Ellsworth, supra note 45, at 1019-20. The authors theorize that personal
experiences make many African-Americans distrustful of egalitarian claims and hence more
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In criminal cases, numerous studies62 confirm the correlation
between a potential juror’s race and initial preconceptions, including
studies showing the influence of race on capital sentencing,63 rape
trials,64 and vehicular homicide mock trials.65 Studies of capital
sentencing show the combined influence of race plus age and race
plus gender.66 Data on race and civil juries is harder to come by.67
One mock study of a products liability case showed that minority
participants were significantly more likely to favor plaintiffs.68
willing than whites to acknowledge some level of ingroup/outgroup bias. Id. at 1019. 
62. For a review of older studies showing influence of race on both predeliberation and
postdeliberation preferences, see King, supra note 11, at 76, 82-85, 89-90 (1993).
63. William J. Bowers et al., Death Sentencing in Black and White: An Empirical Analysis
of the Role of Jurors’ Race and Jury Racial Composition, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 171, 181 (2001)
(“Whites are apt to make pro-prosecution interpretations of evidence, especially when
defendants are black and particularly on highly determinative issues such as eyewitness
identification, probable cause, and resistance to arrest. Blacks may be more critical in their
interpretation of factual questions presented at trial, particularly when police testimony is
involved.... [B]lacks may be more sympathetic than white jurors to mitigating evidence
presented by a black defendant with whom they may be better able to identify and empathize,
and whose background and experiences they may feel they understand better than do their
white counterparts.”). Among the attitudes black and white jurors differ on in death penalty
trials are willingness to believe the defendant is remorseful, id. at 214-16, empathy or
identification with the defendant, id. at 215-77, assessments of the defendant’s future
dangerousness, id. at 219-21, and a desire to show mercy, id. at 214-15, 217-18. In short, “the
race of individual jurors ... infects the capital-sentencing process.” Id. at 266.
64. Id. at 187 (citing GARY D. LAFREE, RAPE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE SOCIAL
CONSTRUCTION OF SEXUAL ASSAULT 154-55, 200-01 (1989)). 
65. David A. Abwender & Kenyatta Hough, Interactive Effects of Characteristics of
Defendant and Mock Juror on U.S. Participants’ Judgment and Sentencing Recommendations,
141 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 603, 608-09 (2001). 
66. Bowers et al., supra note 63, at 188 n.91 (citing David C. Baldus et al., The Use of
Peremptory Challenges in Capital Murder Trials: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 3 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 3, 92 fig.10 (2001) (noting that harsher treatment of black defendants at death-
sentencing stage is curbed “when young black males and middle-aged black females are better
represented on the jury”)); id. at 192 (summarizing different attitudes of white males and
black males toward imposition of the death penalty).
67. See, e.g., Rose, supra note 44, at 131 (noting the dearth of studies about race and civil
juries).
68. Brian H. Bornstein & Michelle Rajki, Extra-Legal Factors and Product Liability: The
Influence of Mock Jurors’ Demographic Characteristics and Intuitions About the Cause of an
Injury, 12 BEHAV SCI. & L. 127, 143 (1994). The phrase “Bronx jury” is generally used to
denote a presumed tendency of minority jurors to favor plaintiffs. According to Rose and
Vidmar, the phrase seems to have been coined by Tom Wolfe in The Bonfire of the Vanities,
in order to describe a plaintiff ’s lawyer’s rationale for filing a medical malpractice case in the
Bronx as “a vehicle for redistributing the wealth.”  Mary R. Rose & Neil Vidmar, Commentary:
The Bronx “Bronx Jury”: A Profile of Civil Jury Awards in New York Counties, 80 TEX. L.
REV. 1889, 1889 (2002). Articles appearing around the same time as Wolfe’s novel in both the
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Another mock study showed the influence of a participant’s race, as
well as other identity factors, in their attitudes toward a plaintiff
suing the police.69 But in their study of a products liability case
given to mock jurors, Diamond, Saks, and Landsman found only a
“modest association” of race, as well as other demographic factors,
with individual verdict preferences.”70 
Although the empirical data can be mixed, in some case scenarios,
the race of individual jurors clearly matters to starting attitudes.
We now need to consider what effect, if any, deliberation has in
shifting juror opinions. Advocates of the cross-sectional jury hold
that diversity makes deliberation dynamic and transforming in
democratically valuable ways; Gerken does not believe deliberation
with any frequency breaks through the domination/subordination
built into the numbers.71 
B. Deliberation
By itself, group deliberation is no guarantee of reasoned argu-
ment.72 As John Stuart Mill lamented, group life is subject to
New York Times and the Wall Street Journal similarly popularized the perception that deep-
pocketed defendants did not fare well in civil trials before minority-dominated juries. Id. But
Rose and Vidmar showed that there never was much of a Bronx effect in the Bronx. Id. at
1896-97.
69. Kahan et al., supra note 43, at 853, 857.
70. Diamond et al., supra note 43, at 306. Minority jurors were more likely than non-
minority jurors to find liability (by a margin of 63% to 46%). Id. However, this seeming
correlation between race and verdict preference became attenuated when the researchers
controlled for other factors influencing initial preferences. Id. Interestingly, even while
reporting on the variability of civil jury verdicts, the authors cast doubt on how much of the
variation could be attributed to second-order diversity. See id. (stating that the composite
model of juror background characteristics left 94.6% of variations in verdicts unexplained).
Instead, the authors singled out jury size as a crucial explanation because juries of six as
opposed to juries of twelve were more likely to be unrepresentative (first-order diverse) and
hence to leave differences among individual perspectives unchecked. Id. at 317. This raises
the possibility that civil jury variation has explanations different than criminal jury variation
because civil juries are more likely to have less than twelve jurors. See Diamond et al., supra
note 44, at 429. But cf. Schkade et al., supra note 2, at 1168 (arguing that jury size would
have only minimal effect on reducing the unpredictability of damage awards).
71. Schkade et al., supra note 2, at 1145.
72. See Adrian Vermeule, Many Minds Arguments in Legal Theory, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS
1, 19-20 (2009) (summarizing some of the ways deliberation can fare poorly); see also Jessica
M. Salerno & Shari Seidman Diamond, The Promise of a Cognitive Perspective on Jury
Deliberation, 17 PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REV. 174, 176 (2010) (citing to studies showing various
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conformist pressures that swamp dissent, unless procedures are in
place to avoid the tyranny of the majority.73 Other group ills include
polarization,74 information cascades,75 and status hierarchies that
make participation unequal.76 There may be biasing effects when
jurors know too much (pre-publicity)77 or too little (who voted what
on secret ballots).78
Studies of both civil juries79 and criminal juries,80 especially
capital juries,81 have documented the pitfalls of deliberation. This
only makes it more imperative, however, to confront Gerken’s
insistence that improving the representativeness of individual juries
forms of cognitive inhibition and diminished recall in collaborative groups).
73. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 18, 20-21, 24, 33 (Andrews U.K. Ltd. rev. ed. 2011).
74. Polarization occurs when group deliberation degenerates into nothing more than an
echo chamber conversation in which like-minded persons reinforce and harden each other’s
views. See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE
L.J. 71, 75-76, 97, 101 (2000). As I will argue below, there are reasons to think that diversity
and dissent can help groups guard against the polarizing effects of group behavior. Charlan
Jeanne Nemeth & Brendan Nemeth-Brown, Better than Individuals? The Potential Benefit
of Dissent and Diversity for Group Creativity, in GROUP CREATIVITY 63, 72-74 (Paul B. Paulus
& Bernard A. Nijstad eds., 2003).
75. Information cascades occur when groups play follow-the-leader and fall in line with
what predecessor groups have done. Nemeth & Nemeth-Brown, supra note 74, at 77.
76. Bowers et al., supra note 63, at 230 (showing that black jurors in interracial capital
penalty cases were least likely to be “among the most talkative” during deliberations and most
likely to feel like outsiders); see also Rose, supra note 44, at 132 (citing a study of fifty
videotaped civil trials in Arizona that found whites speaking more than nonwhites, even after
controlling for income, occupation, gender, and education); Erin York Cornwell & Valerie P.
Hans, Representation Through Participation: A Multilevel Analysis of Jury Deliberations, 45
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 667, 681-82 (2011) (discussing interviews with jurors in noncapital felony
trials suggesting that higher income and education correlate with higher levels of
participation).
77. Norbert L. Kerr et al., Bias in Jurors vs Bias in Juries: New Evidence from the SDS
Perspective, 80 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 70, 81 (1999) (sug-
gesting that deliberation exacerbated biasing effects of pre-trial publicity in close cases but
attenuated it in clear cases).
78. See, e.g., REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY 232 (1983).
79. For a particularly damning study of how deliberation exacerbates the unpredictability
of punitive damage awards, see infra note 236.
80. See, e.g., Howard C. Daudistel et al., Effects of Defendant Ethnicity on Juries’
Dispositions of Felony Cases, 29 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 317, 329-30 (1999) (showing that
in actual felony trials in El Paso, Texas, Anglo-American defendants received sentences
nearly twice as severe as Hispanic defendants from juries that were majority Hispanic); see
also Levinson, supra note 56, at 389 (demonstrating that deliberation only slightly corrects
memory errors). But cf. id. at 414-15 (noting that diverse juries may deliberate more
accurately).
81. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 102-06.
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would do little to change the political dynamics that control
deliberations.
1. Faction Size as an Obstacle to Deliberation
I begin with an argument that Gerken places great emphasis
upon—that verdicts are controlled less by the course of reasoned
deliberation and more by the “social-psychological” pressure that an
initial majority can exercise on outliers.82
This concern with faction size dates back to Kalven and Zeisel’s
pioneering research during the 1950s and 1960s.83 Kalven and
Zeisel famously concluded that “the real decision is often made
before the deliberation begins” because “with very few exceptions
the first ballot decides the outcome of the verdict.”84 Specifically, the
authors found that an initial majority on the first ballot will prevail
in nine out of ten cases.85 
There were always problems, though, with Kalven and Zeisel’s
halting conclusions about deliberation and subsequent studies
suggest that, once a minority coalition reaches three members, the
chances of acquittal rise.86 Let me take these criticisms in turn. 
First, Kalven and Zeisel conceded that their conclusions about
deliberation were nothing more than a “radical hunch,” given that
they had access to only 225 cases that permitted a comparison of
first ballots with final verdicts.87 Second, they presumed that the
first ballot took place prior to deliberation, but this is not always the
case.88 Many juries follow an evidence-driven, rather than verdict-
driven approach, deferring even a first straw vote until after some
amount of deliberation.89 For instance, in Arizona, where research-
ers have been able to view actual deliberations in civil jury trials,
only 20% of the juries took a vote within the first ten minutes of
82. Gerken, supra note 1, at 1125.
83. See generally HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966). 
84. Id. at 488.
85. Id.
86. See infra note 96 and accompanying text. 
87. I owe this observation to Jessica M. Salerno and Shari Seidman Diamond. See Salerno
& Diamond, supra note 72, at 175.
88. Id.
89. See HASTIE ET AL., supra note 78, at 164 (describing a study in which only 28% of mock
juries studied took an immediate vote).
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deliberation.90 Thus, when a first ballot is finally taken, the results
might already show the effects of argument and conversation.91
Third, their own finding that initial majorities do not prevail in 10%
of their trial sample should never have been cavalierly written off
as showing that deliberation does not matter.92 
Studies subsequent to Kalven and Zeisel have only partially
confirmed the hypothesis that an initial majority’s preferred verdict
will be the jury’s final decision.93 The threshold for conviction seems
to have gone from Kalven and Zeisel’s “initial majority” to a “two-
thirds” threshold and now to “somewhat higher than two-thirds.”94
One review of the empirical literature—relied on by Gerken—places
the tipping point for conviction between an 8:4 and 9:3 initial vote.95
What this means is that “the odds of acquittal increase dramati-
cally,” when a minority coalition crosses the threshold of one-third of
a twelve person jury.96 This data suggests “a large potential role for
the impact of jury deliberations” on the many juries that begin with
only a weak majority faction.97 In one study of civil juries in par-
ticular, analysis of responses from 1385 jurors serving on 172 civil
jury trials showed nearly 40% reported changing their initial verdict
preference during deliberations.98 This same study concluded, about
90. Salerno & Diamond, supra note 72, at 175. 
91. Maria Sandys & Ronald C. Dillehay, First-Ballot Votes, Predeliberation Dispositions,
and Final Verdicts in Jury Trials, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 175, 191-92 (1995). Even if a first
vote is taken immediately, studies show an “order effect” on supposedly initial individual pre-
ferences, with those voting first influencing subsequent voters. Id. Thus, if the first ballot
is public, the tally may already reflect group influence. I mention this because it gives some
reason to believe that deliberation might work better on juries that defer a first-vote until
discussing the evidence or a least take votes by secret ballot. See, e.g., HASTIE ET AL., supra
note 78, at 232 (explaining how jurors that defer a vote are less likely to hang).
92. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 83, at 488.
93. See infra notes 94-100.
94. See Salerno & Diamond, supra note 72, at 175.
95. Dennis J. Devine et al., Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of Research on Deliberating
Groups, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 622, 691-92 (2001). 
96. Id. at 692 (summarizing the evidence in criminal cases as suggesting “that if 7 or
fewer jurors favor conviction at the beginning of deliberation, the jury will probably acquit,
and if 10 or more jurors believe the defendant is guilty, the jury will probably convict. With
8 or 9 jurors initially favoring conviction, the final verdict is basically a toss-up.”). 
97. Salerno & Diamond, supra note 72, at 175; see also Diamond et al., supra note 44, at
443 (citing to study showing that a minority of two is “viable”).
98. Paula L. Hannaford et al., The Timing of Opinion Formation by Jurors in Civil Cases:
An Empirical Examination, 67 TENN. L. REV. 627, 628, 638 (2000).
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civil trials, that they show “fluidity of civil juror opinion formation
and the significance of group influence.”99 Importantly, “jurors
tended to rely on each other to a greater extent when the weight of
the evidence was fairly close, at least with respect to making up
their minds.”100
Another factor to consider is that many civil and criminal juries
face more than an either/or verdict. For instance, even after finding
a defendant liable and assessing compensatory damages, civil juries
sometimes must choose whether to assess punitive damages and, if
so, in what dollar amount. Likewise in murder trials, the choice is
not simply guilty versus not guilty but, if guilty, guilty of first or
second degree murder or even manslaughter. This range of choices
means that final verdicts often do not neatly reflect who won or who
lost and may mask considerable compromise, influence, and shifts
during jury deliberations. As two commentators summarize their
research about complex jury decisions, the verdicts “did not
mechanically reflect the predeliberation average or majority verdict
preference.”101 
Some of the most important studies of faction size and jury
verdict come from the capital sentencing phase of death penalty
trials. In a set of seventy-four penalty phase trials with an African-
American defendant and a white victim, William Bowers and
colleagues in the Capital Jury Project documented a “white male
dominance effect” and a “black male presence” effect.102 The “white
male dominance effect” provides support for Gerken’s views about
“tipping points” on juries, insofar as the Bowers group found that
the “presence of five or more white males on the jury dramatically
increased the likelihood of a death sentence.”103 On the other hand,
99. Id. at 652.
100. Id. at 642.
101. Salerno & Diamond, supra note 72, at 175 (“The modal verdict preference of juries
with a choice of four verdicts in a homicide trial was not the most frequent individual
predeliberation verdict preference.”). 
102. Bowers et al., supra note 63, at 192-93.
103. Id. at 193 (finding a forty-point difference in the likelihood of a death sentence
between juries with four and those with five white male jurors—23.1% vs. 63.2% in black
defendant/white victim [B/W] cases). In other words, “[t]he death penalty is three times as
likely for the defendant in a B/W case who draws five or more white male jurors as for the one
who draws fewer.” Id. at 259; see also Anwar et al., supra note 2, at 1032, 1048 (discussing a
similar situation in death sentencing in two Florida counties). In a rare study that shifts from
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the “black male presence” effect is harder to reconcile with Gerken’s
tendency to dismiss the influence of minority factions on strong
majority juries. Bowers found that the presence of a single black
juror reduced the likelihood of a death sentence from 72% to 43%.104
Moreover, white male dominance and black male presence had
independent effects. In the absence of white male dominance (i.e.,
when there were four or fewer white male jurors), the presence of
two or more back male jurors reduced the death sentencing rate to
21.4%.105 A study of capital jury sentencing in Sarasota and Lake
Counties, Florida similarly found the presence of even one black
juror to have dramatic effects on the likelihood of a death
sentence.106
Such evidence does not show that capital juries are deliberating
in any reasoned sense—far from it.107 But it does show why seeking
as much cross-sectional representation on each and every death
penalty jury is crucial.108 Because every state but Florida requires
the jury to be unanimous in choosing a sentence of death, holdouts
do more than hang a jury; without their consent, the penalty
decision by default is a life sentence. 
a white/black focus to an Anglo/Hispanic concern, data from 317 noncapital felony cases in El
Paso, Texas indicated that majority Hispanic juries imposed far more severe sentences on
Anglo than on Hispanic defendants. Daudistel et al., supra note 80, at 329-30.
104. Bowers et al., supra note 63, at 193; see also Bowers et al., supra note 12, at 1501. In
contrast to the decided effect jury composition had on black defendant/white victim cases,
Bowers found little influence in cases in which the defendant and victim were of the same
race. Bowers et al., supra note 63, at 194. 
105. Bowers et al., supra note 63, at 193-94.
106. See Anwar et al., supra note 2, at 1099. 
107. Bowers notes that African-American jurors were likely to be dissatisfied with
deliberation in cases involving black defendants and white victims, and more likely than
white jurors to describe the deliberations as rushed or dominated by a few strong per-
sonalities. Bowers et al., supra note 63, at 229-31. Moreover, if anything, the views of black
and white jurors become progressively polarized as deliberations on the death penalty
proceed. Id. at 200-02. But cf. Marder, supra note 14, at 659, 694, 699, 711 (finding no
correlation between a juror’s race and age and ratings on the thoroughness, hostility, or
unanimity of deliberations in interviews with jurors who served on noncapital criminal trials
in Los Angeles).
108. In their study of peremptory challenges in Philadelphia capital cases, Baldus and his
colleagues found that prosecution and defense engaged in mirror-image, race-based strikes
against black (or white) prospective jurors but that the prosecution was more effective in
reducing the number of persons seated on capital juries from its prime target group: young
black women and men. This success “resulted in a significantly elevated death-sentencing
rate.” See Baldus et al., supra note 66, at 126.
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Imagine, as Justice Brennan did in his dissent in McCleskey v.
Kemp, a lawyer having to advise a black defendant charged with
killing a white man, who faces trial before a jury with no African-
Americans on it.109 It would be small comfort to such a defendant to
know that second-order diversity, in other trials, had given other
defendants a better draw when it came to racial composition. His
chances of a fair hearing on the death penalty depend heavily on the
racial composition of the only jury that matters—his own. Whatever
advantages second-order diversity may bring for other defendants
does not compensate for the loss of first-order diversity in any
particular trial.110
2. Diversity as an Aid to Deliberation
If initial divisions among jurors are not as controlling of final
verdicts as some theories about group dynamics predict, then we
need to consider what effects deliberation has on the final
verdict—and in turn what effects jury composition has on jury
deliberation.
 Let me concede immediately that two of the most frequently cited
sources for the benefits of group diversity do not tell us much of
interest about the jury.
The first source is Condorcet’s famous Jury Theorem, which sets
out to demonstrate mathematically why there is wisdom in the
multitude. If we assume that every individual has a greater than
random chance of getting the answer right, then the greater the
number of persons in a group, the more likely the group will arrive
109. 481 U.S. 279, 321 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
110. It might compensate somewhat if second-order diversity gave prosecutors pause before
seeking the death penalty against any particular defendant. Still this depends on the numbers
and how risk-averse prosecutors are to drawing a minority-dominated jury. Consider, for
instance, Gerken’s hypothetical jurisdiction that is 65% white and 35% black. Random
selection creates a probability that African-Americans will be in the majority on 8.3% of juries
and that whites will be in the majority in 79.8%, with the rest being evenly split. Gerken,
supra note 1, at 1113 tbl.1. Conceivably, such odds could deter the prosecutor from seeking
the death penalty. See id. at 1138 n.101. But if 44.2% of all juries can be expected to have
three or four African-American jurors, as they should have under conditions of random
selection, id. at 1113 tbl.1, the comparatively high odds of drawing one of these first-order
diverse juries might have more influence on the prosecutor’s decision than is exercised by the
lower odds of drawing a minority-dominated jury. 
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at a correct outcome.111 Applied to juries, the notion is that represen-
tative juries will include individuals with different perspectives
based on different experiences and information. By aggregating
their information, they increase the chances that the jury will reach
the correct outcome.
The trouble is that the Condorcet theorem depends on each
individual arriving at his or her preferred outcome independently
of others.112 It is, as Rousseau anticipated,113 an argument against
deliberation rather than for it. The only jury system that I know of
that practices Condorcet’s theorem is in Brazil, where jurors cast
independent ballots and are precluded from discussing the
evidence.114 In short, the Condorcet theorem does not justify our jury
practices.
Research from the business world is a second cited source for why
juries should be diverse. Scott Page has presented case studies in
which diverse management groups “outperformed groups composed
of the best individual performers.”115 Page, however, is careful to
note limits on any mantra that “diversity trumps ability.”116 In
many instances, the task requires “relevant cognitive skills,” and
recruitment can be narrowly geared toward assembling a team that,
while including a mix of perspectives, employs only individuals with
the needed skills.117 
But what are the relevant cognitive skills a juror should have? If
we knew the answer, I am inclined to think we should dispense with
111. For a description of the theorem, see Solomon, supra note 33, at 1362; Vermeule,
supra note 72, at 3-6.
112. Solomon, supra note 33, at 1362; Vermeule, supra note 72, at 6.
113. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT BK. II, ch. 3, at 42-43 (explaining
that if when a sufficiently informed populace deliberates, the citizens were to have no
communication among themselves, “the general will would always result from the great
number of little differences, and their deliberation would always be [good]”).
114. ABRAMSON, supra note 14, at 205. 
115. Scott E. Page, Making the Difference: Applying a Logic of Diversity, 21 ACAD. OF MGMT.
PERSP. 6, 9 (2007). For a review of studies showing benefits of group diversity, see Samuel R.
Sommers, Determinants and Consequences of Jury Racial Diversity: Empirical Findings,
Implications, and Directions for Further Research, 2 SOC. ISSUE & POL’Y REV. 65, 83 (2008). 
116. Page, supra note 115, at 9.
117. Id. at 16. While noting some correlation between identity-diversity and cognitive
diversity, Page warns against relying too much on a person’s group identity as a proxy for
what the group really needs, which is a diversity of relevant cognitive perspectives. Id. at 17-
18.
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random selection and screen directly for the best jurors.118 As Jon
Elster argues, however, history is littered with failed attempts to
select for the right decision-makers.119 In the jury context, we make
do with procedures for keeping jury deliberations fair, no matter
who is doing the deliberating. In this section, I argue that designing
juries to be diverse is crucial to minimizing errors due to bias.120
a. Actual Jury Deliberations
As opposed to studies of groups in the business world, we have
few opportunities to examine deliberation on real juries.121 However,
a pilot program in Arizona permitted researchers both to videotape
juror deliberations in 50 civil trials and to interview 1,385 jurors in
172 civil jury trials.122 Although researchers did not specifically
study the influence of jury composition on deliberations, their data
illumines general features of deliberation. On the one hand, nearly
half of the interviewed jurors123 reported forming opinions and
118. Consider, for instance, Jason Solomon’s observation that the “best way to maximize
cognitive diversity is to have a variety of occupational and educational backgrounds in the
jury.” Solomon, supra note 33, at 1368.
119. ELSTER, supra note 11, at 6, 7, 13.
120. In voir dire, we do try to weed out biased candidates, but detection is difficult because
persons may be unaware of their own biases and would be reluctant to acknowledge them at
any rate. Diversity on juries serves to do what voir dire cannot: let imperfectly impartial
persons work together to neutralize bias. 
121. Kalven and Zeisel set out to audiotape actual jury deliberations, but Congress
responded by passing an anti-eavesdropping statute applicable to federal juries. With rarity,
some states have permitted an actual criminal jury deliberation to be recorded. See, e.g.,
Frontline, Inside the Jury Room (PBS television broadcast April 8, 1986) (depicting recorded
deliberations in a Wisconsin criminal jury trial). 
122. The pilot study was in connection with a rule change in Arizona that permitted jurors
to discuss the evidence during breaks in trial, provided all were present. Valerie P. Hans et
al., The Arizona Jury Reform, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 349, 351-52 (1999). The purpose of the
studies was to ascertain the effects of the rule change. In the studies, researchers were able
to compare reports from actual jurors instructed that they were permitted to discuss the
evidence and reports from jurors instructed under the old rule to refrain from such
discussions. For a study of the interviews, see Hannaford et al., supra note 98, and Hans et
al., supra. For studies of the recorded civil jury deliberations, see Shari Seidman Diamond et
al., Juror Discussions During Civil Trials: Studying an Arizona Innovation, 45 ARIZ. L. REV.
1 (2003) [hereinafter Diamond et al., Juror Discussions]; see also Shari Seidman Diamond et
al., The “Kettleful of Law” in Real Jury Deliberations: Successes, Failures, and Next Steps, 106
NW. U. L. REV. 1537 (2012) [hereinafter Diamond et al., Jury Deliberations]. 
123. For problems inherent in relying on recall and self-reports about deliberation from
jurors interviewed after the fact, see Barbara O’Brien et al., Ask and What Shall Ye Receive?
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leaning one way by the close of evidence.124 On the other hand, over
95% of jurors reported that they changed their minds at least once
about how they were leaning.125 Over 20% attributed their change
of minds to discussions with other jurors during trials and nearly
40% overall changed their minds during final deliberation.126 
Taking note of an earlier mock jury study that dismissed
deliberation as having little effect on jurors’ verdict preferences,127
the researchers were struck by interview reports highlighting shifts
in individual opinions after group discussion.128 They hypothesized
that their different assessment of the importance of group discus-
sion might be due to the Arizona jurors having been selected “from
a far more diverse jury pool” than was true of the “homogeneous and
unrepresentative demographic characteristics” of those recruited for
the earlier mock study.129 
Turning from interview data to the recordings themselves,
researchers set out to test whether the rule change (permitting
jurors to discuss the evidence during trial breaks) contributed to
greater group understanding of the testimony.130 Content analysis
revealed that large amounts of time were spent on “fact exchanges”
(e.g., When did the independent medical exam occur?) or on “infer-
ence exchanges” (e.g., If the other car swerved to the right, then how
could the damage have been only to the left bumper?).131 Such
content corroborated long-standing hypotheses that jurors are not
passive recipients of testimony, but rather they actively engage
during trial in trying to draw inferences that will weave the facts
into a persuasive narrative or story.132 When given the opportunity
to discuss the evidence even before formal deliberations, jurors
A Guide for Using and Interpreting What Jurors Tell Us, 14 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 201,
204-07 (2011).
124. Hannaford et al., supra note 98, at 637 fig.1.
125. Id. at 636.
126. Id. at 638.
127. Id. at 678 n.7 (citing H. P. Weld & E. R. Danzig, A Study of the Way in Which a Verdict
is Reached by a Jury, 1940 AM. J. PSYCHOL. 518).
128. Id. at 652.
129. Id. at 650-51. 
130. The sample included twenty-six motor vehicle cases, seventeen miscellaneous tort
cases, four medical malpractice cases, and three contract cases. See Diamond et al., Juror
Discussions, supra note 122, at 19.
131. Id. at 42.
132. See, e.g., HASTIE ET AL., supra note 78, at 22-23 (summarizing the story model).
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began working together on constructing that story and on influenc-
ing one another through information exchanged.133 
To my knowledge, no similar study of actual recorded criminal
jury deliberations exists. But we do have a large archival and
interview project about deliberations in death penalty cases from
the Capital Jury Project referred to in Part II.B.1. Interviews with
1,155 jurors who served on 340 death penalty trials showed
pronounced differences between white and black jurors during the
sentencing phase of deliberations, with the sharpest differences
separating black male and white male jurors. Among the differences
were (1) assessments of the crime itself on a rating scale from
vicious to not cold-blooded, (2) assessments on how much the victim
suffered, (3) lingering doubts from the guilt phase re-expressed, (4)
predisposition to thinking of death as the only appropriate sentence,
(5) view of the defendant as a future danger versus seeing him as
remorseful, and (6) openness to considering mitigating circum-
stances.134 These differences no doubt explain why death versus life
recommendations vary so much with the racial composition of
capital juries, as we reviewed in Part II.B.1.135
b. Mock Jury Deliberations
As opposed to observations of real juries, mock jury studies have
the advantage of being able to control for jury composition. The most
complete recent study comparing the deliberative performance of
diverse and homogeneous juries was reported by Sommers in
2006.136 With the cooperation of a local court, Sommers recruited
133. One of the concerns with permitting early discussion is that it might lock jurors into
a premature decision, before all the evidence is in. See Diamond et al., Juror Discussions,
supra note 122, at 48-67 (finding little distortion through precommitment).
134. See Bowers et al., supra note 63, at 244-59; see also Bowers et al., supra note 12, at
1513.
135. For a smaller study of criminal jury deliberation based on post-trial interviews with
Los Angeles jurors who served on noncapital criminal trials, see Marder, supra note 14, at 700
(finding that jurors from gender diverse panels reported less hostility, more thoroughness,
and more satisfaction than reported by jurors on non-gender diverse panels; racial
composition did not appear to have discernible effects). 
136. Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity and Group Decision Making: Identifying
Multiple Effects of Racial Composition on Jury Deliberations, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 597, 597-612 (2006).
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members from the actual jury pool to serve as mock jurors. He
varied the composition of each mock jury, so that half were all-white
and half had four white and two black members. Each panel
watched a video summary of a trial of a black defendant charged
with sexual assault.137
Sommers concentrated on differences in the behavior of white
(majority) jurors when they were placed on diverse as opposed to
homogeneous juries. Working from a hypothesis that the mere
expectation of deliberating on a mixed panel might change the initial
verdict preferences of participants, Sommers confirmed that whites
placed on diverse panels were already, even prior to deliberation,
less likely to form an initial guilty preference than were whites on
homogeneous panels138 
This finding made sense when considered in light of Sommers’s
previous findings that white bias against black defendants becomes
muted in cases in which race is a salient issue in the case. Appar-
ently, any case becomes race salient for a white juror by the mere
knowledge that she or he will end up deliberating the evidence on
a racially mixed jury. Basic norms against bias are triggered in
individual white jurors even before deliberation begins—if they are
hearing the evidence sitting on a racially mixed panel.139 Once such
a norm shift occurs, the white jurors on mixed panels processed the
evidence with more care and less bias, at least as measured in terms
of demonstrable misstatements of fact or failures of recall.140 
This norm-shifting effect should be distinguished from a second
benefit of diverse juries, an epistemic or error-catching benefit more
directly attached to differences in information exchange during
deliberations.141 As expected, black jurors made references to issues
137. Id. at 601-03. Part of the experiment confirmed earlier findings by Sommers and
Ellsworth that white participants start with less bias against black defendants in cases in
which race is a salient issue. In this study, Sommers made race salient for half of the panels
by specifically asking about race during voir dire. Id. at 601. Sommers reported that mock
jurors who underwent the race-salient voir dire were less likely to vote guilty prior to
deliberations. Id. at 603 fig.1.
138. Id. at 603, 605-07. 
139. Id. at 607.
140. Id. at 606-07.
141. A theory of “information exchange” should not be confused with a theory about
“information aggregation” of the sort implicit in Condorcet’s Jury Theorem. As we saw, the
Condorcet theorem depends on simply adding up the independently arrived at votes of
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that put possibilities of bias on the table for discussion. But it was
the white jurors on diverse panels who were responsible for making
exchange of information and perspectives different than what it was
on the homogeneous panels.142 White jurors serving on racially
mixed panels were the most likely to bring up concerns about racial
profiling, police behavior, or prejudice against black defendants. 
In other words, the enriched information exchange was not due
solely to remarks made by African-American jurors—as if there was
some “monolithic ‘minority experience’” African-Americans were
there to educate whites about.143 Instead, the very presence of two
African-American jurors on a six person panel transformed the
behavior of white jurors, motivating them to initiate conversations
about whether extraneous racial factors had tainted the evidence.
To use one of Gerken’s favorite metaphors, white jurors “turned the
tables” on themselves, considering the evidence from the minority
point of view even when they were a four to two majority.144
Putting the broader exchange of information together with norms
that trigger an anti-bias alert in white jurors, deliberations on
racially diverse groups were “more thorough and competent” than
deliberations on homogeneous ones, as measured in any number of
ways.145 Diverse groups deliberated longer (50.67 minutes compared
to 38.49), discussed more case facts (30.48 to 25.93), committed less
factual inaccuracies (4.14 to 7.28), left fewer inaccurate statements
uncorrected (1.36 to 2.49), cited to more pieces of evidence they
considered missing (1.87 to 1.07), raised a greater number of race-
related issues (3.79 to 2.07), made more mentions of racism (1.35 to
individuals. See supra text accompanying note 112. By contrast, a theory of information
exchange suggests that a jury verdict will have more democratic legitimacy, and perhaps more
accuracy, when reasoned communication of information and perspectives changes the votes
to be had. For the differences between legitimacy and accuracy of verdicts, see infra Part
II.B.3. For examples of information exchange observed in the recorded Arizona civil juries, see
Diamond et al., Juror Discussions, supra note 122, at 42-48.
142. Sommers, supra note 136, at 606.
143. Id. at 608. For this reason, the Sommers study of deliberation does not support
essentialist claims about group identity. In ways Gerken would appreciate, whites ended up
expressing so-called “black” concerns about racial profiling and the like. 
144. See Gerken, supra note 1, at 1142.
145. Sommers, supra note 136, at 608.
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0.93), and had fewer objections when racism was mentioned as
relevant (22% of the time to 100%).146
3. Diversity and Legitimacy
I defer to the conclusion of this Article whether the Sommers data
shows that heterogeneous juries reach more “accurate” or “correct”
verdicts than homogeneous juries.147 What we even mean by calling
a verdict “correct” is complicated, as juries do more than find facts
but must interpret the facts to decide, in a criminal case, whether
they constitute the “malice” that distinguishes murder from
manslaughter or, in a civil case, whether the defendant’s conduct is
“egregious” enough to warrant punitive damages. In civil cases
involving damage awards, as Jason Solomon notes, the measure of
a correct answer is debatable.148
Legitimacy, however, is not the same thing as accuracy, and we
should consider the effects of jury composition on the former. As
Solomon pointed out in considering the civil jury, the concept of
legitimacy has both a sociological and a normative component.
Sociological legitimacy is basically the empirical claim that the jury
bolsters public confidence in the fairness of the civil justice
system.149 Because an important goal in any legal system is that the
law be politically acceptable and capable of generating “voluntary
146. Id. at 605 tbl.2; see also Levinson, supra note 56, at 414-15 (describing how diverse
juries exhibit superior memory recall).
147. See infra text accompanying notes 324-40. Sommers does suggest that there are better
or worse ways to process information and that service on diverse panels had positive effects
on the cognitive performance of white jurors. Sommers, supra note 136, at 606-07. But he does
not attempt to assess whether the verdicts rendered on the diverse panels were more “correct”
than those reached on all-white panels, noting instead elsewhere that “‘[b]etter’ is an elusive
concept when it comes to jury decisions, for which a gold standard typically does not exist.”
Sommers, supra note 115, at 95. Interestingly, there turned out to be no significant
differences—little second-order diversity—among the panels when it came to likelihood of
convicting or acquitting. Sommers, supra note 136, at 604 tbl.1. As Rose has noted, the
“disconnect” between the demonstrated effects of race during deliberations and its apparent
lack of effect on final verdicts is intriguing. See Rose, supra note 44, at 134-35.
148. Solomon, supra note 33, at 1367 n.182. 
149. Id. at 1370.
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compliance,”150 any contribution of the civil jury to perceptions of the
law as fair would be an important political function.151
Normatively, the concept of legitimacy goes beyond public
perceptions and depends on law having the moral and democratic
authority to claim our consent to it.152 Ideally, that moral basis for
obeying law should be sturdy enough to justify why we are obliged
to obey the law—to obey jury verdicts—even when they go against
our preferred outcome.
When it comes to promoting public confidence in trials (sociologi-
cal legitimacy), some scholars single out the civil jury as having
special problems, noting declines in its use, the political popularity
of tort reforms, surveys that have most Americans agreeing that
“plaintiffs get too much” from juries, and a general sense that “faith
in the civil jury appears to be falling.”153 Not everyone agrees with
this assessment. A recent poll found that 64% of respondents
favored leaving juries to decide civil lawsuits, as opposed to only
27% preferring bench trials.154 The same study showed an overall
high level of confidence in the civil justice system as a whole.155
Rather than arbitrate this dispute,156 though, I turn to studies that
show diverse juries do more to generate public confidence than
homogeneous juries do. Ellis and Diamond report a California
150. Kahan et al., supra note 43, at 884.
151. See Ellis & Diamond, supra note 13, at 1039-40 (citing to studies showing that “people
are more willing to accept decisions and to adhere to agreements over time when they
perceive those decisions as having been produced by fair procedures”).
152. Kahan et al., supra note 43, at 884.
153. Solomon, supra note 33, at 1372-74; see also Jeffrey Abramson, The Jury and Popular
Culture, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 497, 515 (2000) (citing to studies showing that 80% of jurors
interviewed thought there were too many frivolous lawsuits). But see Valerie P. Hans &
Stephanie Albertson, Empirical Research and Civil Jury Reform, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1497, 1507-08 (2003) (refuting accuracy of perception that juries are pro-plaintiff and anti-
business).
154. DRI, THE DRI NATIONAL POLL ON THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM 1, 3-5 (2012),
http://www.dri.org/contentdirectory/public/polls/2012%20DRI%20survey%20analysis.pdf.
155. Id. at 4; see also Shari Seidman Diamond & Mary R. Rose, Real Juries, 1 ANN. REV.
L. & SOC. SCI. 255, 258 (2005) (citing to a 2004 Harris interactive poll showing high citizen
regard for jury duty).
156. The dispute seems evidence of what Laura Gaston Dooley refers to as the “bipolar
presence” the civil jury “has in the popular consciousness,” revered as an iconic democratic
institution but reviled “as an agent of arbitrary injustice.” Laura Gaston Dooley, Our Juries,
Our Selves: The Power, Perception, and Politics of the Civil Jury, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 325, 325
(1995).
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survey in which two-thirds of respondents “agreed that the decisions
reached by racially diverse juries are more fair than decisions
reached by single race juries.”157 And they ran a confirming mock
jury study that showed circumstances in which ratings of trial
fairness were more favorable when the jury was heterogeneous
rather than homogeneous.158 Participants were given a summary of
a shoplifting trial with a black defendant.159 Four different scenarios
were constructed involving not guilty or guilty verdicts rendered by
homogeneous or heterogeneous juries.160 When the observers were
asked to rate the fairness of trials resulting in not guilty verdicts,
their ratings did not vary with the racial composition of the jury.161
When the verdict was guilty, however, participants rated the trial
as significantly more fair when the jury was heterogeneous.162 
It is worth pausing to consider why the cross-sectional jury
inspires more confidence in jury verdicts than Gerken’s alternative
of legitimation through different groups taking turns being the
dominant faction on some jury. What jurors do is opaque, whereas
who they are, in group identity terms, is more transparent and
public. This factor of visibility, the ability of competing groups to see
persons such as themselves on the jury, fits with what research on
procedural justice tells us is a crucial characteristic that makes
people perceive a process as fair: that the decision maker be
identifiable as neutral.163 The visible representativeness of the
cross-sectional jury speaks to that neutrality in circumstances in
which the “black box” surrounding jury deliberations keeps us from
knowing what actually is said.164 
157. Ellis & Diamond, supra note 13, at 1039 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Diamond et al., supra note 44, at 425 (observing that jury composition is perceived “as a proxy
for the fairness of a trial”).
158. Ellis & Diamond, supra note 13, at 1043-48.
159. Id. at 1044.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1048.
163. Id. at 1040-41.
164. Or at least it does if jurors do not see themselves—and are not seen by the public—as
there to represent constituencies. Elsewhere I have emphasized the danger that the concept
of “visible representativeness” or “mirror-image” representation can have unfortunate
spillover effects if it communicates to jurors and the public that the juror role is to be a
representative of the partisan sort. See, e.g., ABRAMSON, supra note 14, at 140. But this need
not occur. Hospitals, for instance, put together teams of specialists to mull over the best
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By contrast, Gerken’s case for second-order diversity rests on the
democratic benefit of making the non-neutrality of juries visible for
all to see simply by looking at who is the numerically dominant
faction.165 The above research suggests that second-order diversity
might have delegitimizing effects on public confidence in jury
verdicts.
It is the threat to the moral or democratic legitimacy of jury
verdicts, however, that most concerns me about Gerken’s rejection
of even the aspiration to recruit for cross-sectional juries. Advocates
of both first- and second-order diversity can agree that the demo-
cratic legitimacy of jury verdicts requires equal respect for the input
and views of all jury-eligible citizens. Gerken seems to be suggesting
that individual jury trials frequently do not meet this egalitarian
norm and that we can practice it only in the aggregate. But litigants
do not go to trial before aggregates of juries. Legitimacy requires a
more individualized conception of justice. 
The merit of the cross-sectional ideal—of getting as close to
practicing it as we can—is that it gives moral and democratic
grounding to recognizing any one jury as “standing for” or “standing
in” for the community. In cross-sectional jury selection, every group
has equal opportunity for its members to be on any particular jury,
relative to their percentage of the population. All are invited to
participate in a procedure that is visibly fair precisely because of the
equality of invitation. To the extent we achieve cross-sectionality,
“jury deliberation performs its greatest function” in promoting
democratic legitimacy in those parts of the community that did not
have the verdict go its way.166 When a group has visible representa-
tives present in those deliberations, they can then be morally bound
by the results. They “can be expected to see the law as theirs”
because it “arises from a process that shows due respect” for their
treatment options for a patient. Such team approaches probably do not communicate to the
patient that the recommendations are a mere aggregation of the voting preferences of the
specialists. Presumably, the visibly representative nature of the team gives the patient
confidence that a range of options have been weighed. This example was mentioned to me
some years ago by the political philosopher Alan Wertheimer.
165. It bears repeating here that Gerken is not committed to group identity fissures
opening up on any particular jury. But she does think cracks open up enough to make it worth
our while to pay attention to jury compositional issues.
166. Kahan et al., supra note 43, at 886.
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arguments, and hence for their experiences and identities.167
Whatever legitimacy second-order diversity creates in the aggre-
gate, it does not give moral grounding to the deliberations of any
particular jury.
Granted, random selection is not designed to produce cross-
sectional representation on each and every jury. But the legitimacy
of any one jury that fails to be a microcosm of the community is not
forfeited, so long as community members had a fair and equal
opportunity to be recruited onto that jury.168 This is the democratic
norm housed in the principle of cross-sectional jury selection.169 It
remains an important one to pursue even if we are bound to fall
short of practicing it perfectly. 
III. THE POSITIVE CASE FOR SECOND-ORDER DIVERSITY
In the previous section, we reviewed arguments for diversity’s
contribution to jury deliberation. Diversity (1) creates a normative
set of expectations that prod jurors individually to process the
evidence with more care, (2) widens the information and perspec-
tives exchanged, (3) generates public confidence in verdicts, and (4)
supports the democratic and moral legitimacy of jury decisions.
Gerken is a skeptic about these benefits. But her positive case on
behalf of second-order diversity can stand independently of her
critique of first-order diversity. It may be, for instance, that second-
order diversity among juries brings democratic benefits above and
beyond those I have suggested we get by pursuing cross-sectional
representation on particular juries. I proceed in this section to
consider four arguments on behalf of second-order diversity.
A. Benefits to Jurors
Gerken’s defense starts by locating benefits to the jurors
themselves—their power, participatory opportunities, education,
civic sensibilities, and the like.170 These benefits are said to accrue
167. Id.
168. Gerken, supra note 1, at 1178.
169. Id.
170. See id. at 1191 (describing jury service as an “educative experience” or as an
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to jurors best when they take their turn at the head of the table,
participating on juries as part of the controlling group.171
The benefits flowing to jurors are important to our democracy and
it took long, hard-fought battles to overcome discriminatory
obstacles to establish an equal opportunity to serve as jurors.172
Today, jury duty is “one of the basic rituals by which Americans
confirm their participation in society.”173 What was at stake in those
movements, however, was not just the “liberty” interest of citizens
to be jurors; it was the importance of equality in bearing the
obligations, and responsibilities of citizenship. By joining with other
scholars to accomplish a paradigm shift in jury studies—from the
traditional focus on the legal rights of litigants to a new concern for
the political rights of jurors themselves174—Gerken leaves behind
the peculiar ways in which jury duty is a surviving example of what
Jeremy Waldron calls “responsibility-rights.”175
Consider, for instance, a design feature of jury selection that
Gerken does not especially concentrate on: the use of a draft.176
Citizens have voting rights, but they have no responsibility to
exercise them. Jury enfranchisement is different—it is an involun-
tary obligation, a duty we impose on all eligible citizens. The
military draft once spoke not to the “liberty” of citizens but rather
to their obligations and to the dignity and the respect we should
accord those in service. Likewise, the obligatory nature of jury duty
speaks to the importance of imbuing in jurors an understanding
“empowering” political experience). 
171. Id. at 1142.
172. See, e.g., LINDA K. KERBER, NO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE LADIES: WOMEN AND THE
OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP 136 (1998).
173. Id. at 128.
174. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 93-
94 (1998); Vikram David Amar, Jury Service as Political Participation Akin to Voting, 80
CORNELL L. REV. 203 (1995); Re, supra note 35, at 1581-82; Barbara D. Underwood, Ending
Race Discrimination in Jury Selection: Whose Right Is It, Anyway?, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 725,
727 (1992).
175. Jeremy Waldron, Dignity, Rights, and Responsibilities, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1107, 1116
(2011); see also Robert P. Burns, The Dignity, Rights, and Responsibilities of the Jury: On the
Structure of Normative Argument, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1147 (2011).
176. To be fair, Gerken pays close attention to the jury as a “forced” experience. See
Gerken, supra note 1, at 1152-58. But she concentrates on how such an experience does or
does not benefit jurors democratically, and does not in my judgment adequately describe a
design geared toward jury duty as a responsibility. Id.
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that it is not their own rights but those of others they are responsi-
ble to defend.177 This formulation may not be quite correct—it is
more the dignity of justly defending the rights of others by exercis-
ing and not shirking the equal liberty to be a juror. 
When so many of us seek ways to avoid jury duty, the dignity of
the office suffers.178 I suspect that Gerken’s rather full-throttled
defense of the jury as a political institution, if widely accepted,
would further erode any collective sense of moral responsibility for
the well-being of the office. If Gerken is right that second-order
diversity is all about rotating power and control among competing
groups, then the right becomes untethered to any moral conception
of why we trust ordinary persons to use that power responsibly. 
In the civil jury context, striking a balance between the rights and
responsibilities of jury service has been a politically fraught task. As
Laura Gaston Dooley has shown, the rise of judicial controls over
civil juries, such as directed verdicts,179 judgments notwithstanding
the verdict,180 and judgments as a matter of law181 was motivated by
radical mistrust of the ability of ordinary persons to discharge their
moral responsibilities.182 Criminal juries enjoy greater protection
against these forms of judicial reversals, largely because the Double
Jeopardy Clause makes any not guilty verdict final.183 But courts
may reverse civil verdicts, or reduce damage awards, whether they
favor plaintiffs or defendants. Given the long history of judicial
177. See Waldron, supra note 175, at 1124-25.
178. The struggle to balance the right and responsibilities of jury duty is long-standing,
going back to colonial Virginia laws enacting punishments for tobacco farmers who failed to
show for jury duty. See ABRAMSON, supra note 14, at 249.
179. See, e.g., Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 373 (1943) (upholding the
constitutionality of directed verdicts).
180. See, e.g., Balt. & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 661 (1935) (upholding
constitutionality of judgments notwithstanding the verdict). 
181. Since 1991, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have used the generic term
“judgment as a matter of law” to describe both directed verdicts and judgments non obstante
veredicto. See FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)-(b). 
182. Dooley, supra note 156, at 334.
183. It is often said that criminal jurors enjoy the “raw power” to disregard the evidence
and to nullify the law in order to acquit. See, e.g., United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113,
1142-43 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Even if jury nullification is not a legal right of jurors, see id. at 1132,
courts have no authority to reverse acquittals when jurors choose to nullify. Id. Although civil
jurors have not been granted the express equivalent of a “raw power” to nullify, there is some
evidence that they possess that power nonetheless. See Noah, supra note 33, at 1608-18.
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mistrust of civil juries that Dooley documents, we should be careful
with describing jury duty in the sort of political terms that Gerken
tends to use. Gerken’s core argument—that variation in jury
verdicts should be valued on account of, and not despite, the jury
compositional differences driving at least some variations in
verdicts184—could provide cover for further judicial backlash against
civil juries. 
B. The Advantages of Aggregation
As Gerken readily concedes, the isolated experiences of a few
persons on a single jury—a body never to be convened again—are
too fleeting and invisible to diffuse power in society or turn the
tables on the majority.185 In the aggregate, however, minorities come
to have a say on “what the ‘law’ is—or ought to be”186—even when,
as a matter of legislative representation, “they lack the power to
‘author’ the law itself.”187 This is because this very thing—“the
law”—is the editorial product that “emerges from the collective
decisions of many juries.”188 Standing back, we get “a richer picture
of the views of the community as a whole,” by comparing the
verdicts rendered on occasion by minority-controlled juries with the
decisions from majority-controlled juries.189 
But it is not apparent where we go to get this “kaleidoscopic” or
birds-eye view of the range or pattern made by discrete jury
decisions. Gerken speaks of the way the jury system gives the
“minority a chance to call attention to themselves and their views”190
and to “engage in the type of agenda setting that is usually difficult
for those outside the political mainstream to achieve.”191 Putting
aside whether it is a good thing for jurors “to call attention to
themselves and their views,”192 it is difficult to understand the
184. Gerken, supra note 1, at 1165.
185. See id. at 1181.
186. See id. at 1166.
187. See id. at 1127.
188. Id. at 1137-38.
189. Id. at 1161.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1162.
192. Id. at 1161.
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mechanism Gerken has in mind that would publicize all these
various jury data points. She frequently uses the term “visibility” to
describe how minority control over one jury publicizes a dissenting
viewpoint—usually lost in the shadows—and makes it available for
subsequent juries to consider.193 Nonetheless, subsequent jurors
may know little about previous juries, both what they decided and
who was on those juries. 
Typically, we do not keep track of a jury’s group composition and
we rarely are privy to whether groups split on first ballots or straw
votes.194 In short, Gerken assumes an unavailable information
source and imagines what we do not have—an ongoing public
conversation about what different juries, composed in different
ways, decide.195 As Gerken acknowledges, “the form a jury decision
takes limits its effectiveness in promoting visibility.”196 In practice,
“members of the community may not know enough about the case
to understand what the verdict signifie[d] to those who rendered
it.”197 
Throughout her article, Gerken contrasts the high visibility
achieved by election results with the lesser visibility of jury verdicts.
Even she is lukewarm about whether second-order diversity can
deliver the sort of democratic benefits that depend on letting
minorities use the jury system to publicize their different norms and
perspectives.
C. Bargaining in the Shadow of Jury Verdicts
Gerken’s strongest argument for why jury verdicts matter in the
aggregate is that decision makers—be they prosecutors considering
193. Id. 
194. See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross, Race, Peremptories, and Capital Jury Deliberations, 3. U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 283, 295 (2001) (discussing the difficulties of drawing any lessons about a
death-sentence given in a particular case to a black man for killing a white victim because
“[w]e do not know the race of jurors who served (let alone of those who were excused), or how
they interacted with each other, or how they reached their decision”).
195. See id. at 289 (compiling the difficulties of determining the influence of racial
composition on final verdicts in capital cases and explaining that necessary “information is
not sitting around on the shelves. . . . [I]t has to be found, at great cost. Just determining the
race of the potential jurors in any large sample of cases is very difficult.”).
196. Gerken, supra note 1, at 1168.
197. Id. 
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a plea bargain or civil plaintiffs deciding whether (or where) to
exercise their rights to jury trial—make these decisions partly on
the basis of what juries have previously decided in the small
number of cases that go to trial.198 But as I have previously argued,
and as Gerken acknowledges, both first- and second-order diversity
are relevant to these decisions.199 Plaintiffs or prosecutors may be
sufficiently risk averse so that what second-order diversity makes
possible—drawing an outlier jury—affects how they make choices.
In that circumstance, Gerken would be right that second-order
diversity permits groups that dominate only a few juries to exert
more general influence on the strategic choices of plaintiffs and
prosecutors. If these actors are less risk averse, though, they may
be influenced mostly by what first-order diversity tells them “the
law” is, as likely applied by a jury that mirrors a cross-section of the
community.200 
D. Cross-Over Participatory Experiences as a Form of Civic 
Education
Among second-order diversity’s chief benefits are the “eye-
opening” lessons that members of majority groups are said to draw
when the tables are turned on them and they must participate as
part of a numerical minority for a change.201 Gerken is optimistic
that, although this is not an experience that majorities would choose
for themselves, they will come away from jury duty with greater
appreciation for what it is like to be a minority, with “reduce[d] com-
placency” about the costs majority decisions impose on minorities,
198. Id. at 1138 n.101.
199. Id.; see also supra note 110.
200. Consider a well-known example of “jury shopping” in patent infringement cases. The
small town of Marshall, Texas, has emerged as a favored venue because juries there favor
patent holders in 78% of cases. The jury pool in Marshall, compared to larger population
centers, does not produce a good deal of second-order diversity, and so the odds of drawing an
outlier jury are not great to begin with. That may be part of the attraction. But what plaintiffs
are responding to, in marking cases for trial in Marshall, is based on what a jury that “looks
like” Marshall has done in the past. Julie Crewell, So Small a Town, So Many Patent Suits,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2006, at BU1. 
201. Gerken, supra note 1, at 1142.
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and with greater willingness to see matters from the minority point
of view.202
In part, this is an odd argument for Gerken to make because she
is at pains to stress that she is mostly describing our current
practices, which already include majorities sometimes serving on
predominantly minority juries. But if majority members are already
receiving the “sensitivity training” that turning the tables on them
is said to provide,203 then why, in Gerken’s own judgment, are they
so unwilling to listen to minority arguments when they return to
numerical superiority on other juries?204 Presumably, these are
other individuals—not those who got an egalitarian education from
jury duty. But then the benefits seem scattered and coincidental. 
At any rate, it is an open question whether majorities draw or
communicate these enlightened, egalitarian-reinforcing lessons from
serving on minority-dominated juries. Even Gerken concedes that
a reactionary backlash could set in.205 To the extent the public
concludes that minorities seize occasions to exercise “control”206 over
jury verdicts when they can, majorities on future juries might
respond in tit-for-tat fashion, less willing than ever to think
minority arguments are based on evidence, more dismissive of
holdouts, and ready to flex their own majoritarian muscle. Prosecu-
tors might follow by redoubling efforts to use peremptory challenges
to reduce the number of minorities on juries. Judges might strike
more minority jurors for cause, or at least permit greater latitude
during voir dire to explore same-race bias. Presumably, these would
not be the lessons jury trials would teach were they exercises in
deliberative democracy. But what second-order diversity makes
visible for Gerken, above all else, is essentially the politics of who is
in charge. If this is so, it is difficult to see why the variation of
verdict with jury composition would not aggravate group conflict
and polarize jurors into stereotypical ways of regarding each other’s
participation. 
202. Id. at 1163.
203. Id. at 1150.
204. See id. at 1191.
205. Id. at 1165, 1168-69.
206. Id. at 1124, 1164.
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Here we come to one of the most interesting parts of Gerken’s
thesis. She acknowledges that second-order diversity may in fact
exacerbate group conflict by exposing it, making it transparent,
bringing it to the fore.207 For Gerken, this still counts as a demo-
cratic benefit—a contribution of the jury system to making politics
confront issues that otherwise get lost in majoritarian-controlled
institutions.208 This sort of benefit, however, needs to be weighed
carefully against the potential loss to the legitimacy of jury verdicts
in a society convinced they are but expressions of group conflict.
Again, it is difficult to see how minorities are served by teaching
majorities to regard jury verdicts as expressions of group conflict. 
In a manner of speaking, we have been here before. On the day
following the acquittal of O.J. Simpson in 1995, the Wall Street
Journal ran a front page article claiming that predominantly black
juries in major American urban areas, including the Bronx;
Washington, D.C.; and Wayne County (Detroit), were remarkably
acquittal prone, compared to the national average.209 The reporters
suggested that African- American jurors were in revolt, engaged in
acts of jury nullification against the evidence and the law, and used
dominance on juries in their neighborhoods to exercise a form of
black power. To back up this conclusion, they cited a then-famous
article by Professor Paul Butler urging African-American jurors to
engage in open acts of jury nullification.210 And even though Butler’s
plea for nullification was limited to victimless crimes—principally
drug offenses211—the Wall Street Journal implied that the predomi-
nantly black jury in the Simpson trial was willing to nullify in a
case of double murder. 
Not surprisingly, in the wake of media frenzy over the Simpson
verdict, proposals were floated to deal with an alleged breakdown of
the jury system, including calls from the California District Attor-
neys’ Association for abolition of the unanimous verdict as a way to
207. Id. at 1165.
208. Id. at 1165 n.181 (asking the normative question whether “a healthy system requires
the submergence or acknowledgment of evidence of group conflict”).
209. Benjamin A. Holden et al., Color-Blinded?: Race Seems to Play an Increasing Role in
Many Jury Verdicts, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 1995, at A1.
210. Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice
System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 680 (1995).
211. Id. at 715.
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deal with the potential of one or two unreasonable holdouts to hang
entire juries.212 Who were these irrational holdouts? In 1997, The
New Yorker ran a piece by Jeffrey Rosen, which presented anecdotal
evidence from Washington, D.C. that these holdouts were most
likely to be angry or religiously zealous African-American women.213 
Gerken acknowledges that the visibility of a few cases can raise
a public outcry, especially if all that is “visible” to the public is the
purported difference minority dominance on the jury made to the
verdict.214 Perhaps for that reason, she is cautious on the subject of
jury nullification and does not particularly endorse it.215 At first this
reluctance seems odd.216 After all, Gerken thinks it is entirely
legitimate for juries to send political messages, and she cites
approvingly to studies showing the “large number[s] of cases in
which jurors used their verdict to send a message about a broader
political and social issue.”217 The problem with jury nullification is
that the messaging is “opaque,” rather than transparent.218 The
black box of a general verdict means that we never know for sure
whether a jury is nullifying and, if so, for what reasons. 
But walking a tightrope between advocating political messaging
by juries and yet rejecting nullification, as an “unwieldy instrument
of legal reform,”219 is a difficult stunt. One might, instead, throw in
one’s lot with the Fully Informed Jury Association or other groups
seeking to make nullification more visible.220 The question left
212. CAL. DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS’N, NON-UNANIMOUS JURY VERDICTS: A NECESSARY
CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM 6-10 (1995).
213. Jeffrey Rosen, One Angry Woman, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 24, 1997, at 54.
214. Gerken, supra note 1, at 1165.
215. See, e.g., id. at 1168 n.198.
216. For instance, other legal scholars who share Gerken’s concerns about minority
subordination on juries have specifically referred to jury nullification as one way in which
“jurors resist their subordination.” See Gerald Torres & Donald P. Brewster, Judges and
Juries: Separate Moments in the Same Phenomenon, 4 LAW & INEQ. 171, 184 (1986).
217. Gerken, supra note 1, at 1168 n.198 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Mark
Curriden, The American Jury: A Study in Self-Governing and Dispute Resolution, 54 SMU L.
REV. 1691, 1694 (2001)).
218. Id. at 1168-69 n.199 (citing approvingly to a critique of advocacy of nullification as a
form of racial protest in Andrew O. Leipold, The Dangers of Race-Based Jury Nullification:
A Response to Professor Butler, 44 UCLA L. REV. 109, 127 (1996)).
219. Gerken, supra note 1, at 1168-69.
220. Purpose, FULLY INFORMED JURY ASS’N, http://fija.org/about/fijas-purpose/ (last visited
Jan. 29, 2014).
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dangling off the tightrope is why, if political messaging is one of the
benefits of second-order diversity, the power of a few minority hold-
outs to use nullification to hang a majority-controlled jury is not one
of the benefits of first-order diversity. 
E. Impartiality
In the end, Gerken’s defense of second-order diversity comes down
to an argument about the proper meaning of impartiality in the jury
context. Like Gerken, defenders of first-order diversity acknowledge
that traditional notions of impartiality rest on the fiction that
individuals can check all their cultural baggage at the jury room
door.221 No one juror is ever some disembodied agent of pure reason;
everyone edits the law from some perspective. But advocates of
mirror-image representation believe that juries are capable of
achieving a kind of impartiality that individuals cannot achieve
alone. They call this “diffused impartiality”—the result of a process
in which the norms and preconceptions of some are balanced and
informed by the competing norms of others.222 Gerken, however,
offers two objections to diffused impartiality. The first is that it
requires more balance on each jury than the law descriptively
requires.223 The second is that even accomplishing mirror-image
representation would still leave the dominant faction in control, as
opposed to achieving the kind of Madisonian “checks and balances”
that the theory of diffused impartiality requires.224 Thus, for
Gerken, doctrines of impartial justice stand in the way of recogniz-
ing that every jury verdict is political or “partial,” in the special
sense of representing or reflecting “a fraction of the whole.”225
Gerken distinguishes this kind of partiality, which she finds both
inevitable and valuable, from a different kind of partiality shown
221. See Janet Bond Aterton, Unconscious Bias and the Impartial Jury, 40 CONN. L. REV.
1023, 1030 (2008).
222. See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) (citing the “broad rep-
resentative character of the jury” as an “assurance of a diffused impartiality”).
223. See, e.g., Gerken, supra note 1, at 1115-16; see also supra note 27 and accompanying
text.
224. See, e.g., Gerken, supra note 1, at 1125.
225. Id. at 1166.
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when a jury is prejudiced and biased.226 In other words, there could
be alternative explanations as to why two different juries render
different verdicts. The variation might be evidence that one of the
juries was biased, but it could also simply reflect the way each and
every jury’s editorializing reflects the community norms represented
by the groups dominating each jury.227 The latter kind of “partiality”
of each jury verdict—and thus the potential variation among jury
verdicts—is politically valued by Gerken for giving minorities
control over some subset of jury panels generated through the
random selection lottery.
Gerken’s view is at once reasonable and overstated. Consider, for
instance, an argument made by Catharine Wells about what it
means for a civil jury to be objective.228 Wells noted just how deeply
normative and value-laden a tort jury’s inquiry is into whether a
defendant failed to exercise “reasonable care.”229 Like Gerken, she
accepted that the community may well be divided in its normative
viewpoints about standards of care.230 But the jury still has a
paramount obligation to resolve the dispute as objectively as
possible.231 It does this best not by aggregating individual opinions
but by trying to deliberate to a consensus over the proper norm.232
To the extent that a jury containing “a cross section of normative
viewpoints” is able to achieve consensus, that verdict can be
justified as “locally objective.”233 It is not necessarily objective in any
universal or deeply epistemological sense. From a pragmatic point
226. For a similar distinction, see Ellis & Diamond, supra note 13, at 1035.
227. Gerken, supra note 1, at 1166. Gerken treats the all-white jury as a special case when
it comes to her usual willingness to live with the luck of the random selection lottery. Id. at
1178-79. She does not say that an all-white jury is necessarily prejudiced but suggests that
it still may be too partial to be acceptable. Id. But if this is so, then even Gerken wants the
safety-valve that only some theories of first-order diversity permit. And, because on her own
data minorities are not likely to be effectively represented on juries when they occupy only
one or two seats at the table, she may need to fall back on some notion of cross-sectional jury
selection more than at first appears.
228. Wells, supra note 2, at 2408-10.
229. Id. at 2388 (describing the jury’s considerable discretion in “decid[ing] the ultimate
normative questions” that negligence cases raise about duties of care).
230. Id. at 2393-95 (stating that juries are not impersonal decision makers but engage in
viewpoint-dependent inquiry from a diverse set of vantage points).
231. Id. at 2408.
232. Id. at 2408-09.
233. Id. at 2409.
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of view, however, the cross-sectional composition of the jury
underwrites the democratic authority of that jury to locate through
deliberation what that community’s local norms are in that case. 
Gerken concedes—indeed she insists on conceding—that second-
order diversity does not give democratic legitimacy to any one jury’s
verdict. It is the aggregate product that enhances our democracy.
But then she has no answer to why any one jury’s verdict is “locally
objective.” To Gerken, that is the point—jury verdicts one by one are
always partial and political. To my mind, this is the problem. We
have a defense of the jury as a political institution in the aggregate
that does not justify the individual jury as an adjudicative institu-
tion at all. 
IV. CIVIL JURIES: A VARIATION ON VARIATION?
The civil jury provides a stern test for Gerken’s defense of
variation among verdicts as a democratic virtue, not vice. Critics of
the civil jury tend to take the opposite view, singling out variation
as damaging to both the adjudicative and political functions of the
civil jury. On the adjudicative side, some of the most severe criticism
is directed at the apparent arbitrariness in punitive damage awards
from one jury to the next.234 But critics of the civil jury see inconsis-
tency of verdicts as a problem across a host of case types.235 Far from
steadying the swings of the pendulum, one study shows deliberation
about monetary awards is itself a source of erratic swaying caused
by little more than rhetoric.236 
234. See, e.g., Schkade et al., supra note 2, at 1145 (explaining that punitive damage
awards are “pervaded by a degree of unpredictability and variance, resulting in apparent
arbitrariness, as the similarly situated are treated differently”); see also  Diamond et al.,
supra note 43, at 318 (describing “high variability” in pain and suffering awards); Schkade et
al., supra note 2, at 1145-46 (citing to a study of pain and suffering cases showing 60% of
awards are based on “noise” rather than objective factors and to a separate study of sexual
harassment cases failing to find any connection between case characteristics and damages
awarded); Peter H. Schuck, Judicial Avoidance of Juries in Mass Tort Litigation, 48 DEPAUL
L. REV. 479, 480 (1998) (explaining that in mass tort litigation, “variability in trial
outcomes—even assuming that the underlying facts are identical—may be significant”). But
cf. Diamond & Rose, supra note 155, at 264-65 (providing explanations of variance in damage
awards).
235. See, e.g., Bornstein & Rajki, supra note 68, at 143 (finding that liability judgments in
products liability mock trials varied according to juror race).
236. See Schkade et al., supra note 2, at 1172-73. The Schkade study found that group
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On the political side, variation is criticized for clouding, rather
than clarifying, what the jury system is saying about the important
normative questions that lurk within even ordinary tort cases.237 In
negligence cases, the civil jury illustrates Gerken’s point about the
editorial discretion juries have to interpret what the legal standard
of “ordinary” or “reasonable” care requires in concrete circum-
stances.238 In product liability cases, the jury is instructed that a
product is “unreasonably dangerous” if it contains dangers beyond
those that an “ordinary consumer” with “ordinary knowledge
common to the community” would contemplate when using the
product.239 In all punitive damage deliberations, the question is
whether the defendant’s conduct was “egregious” enough to warrant
punishment and if so, what dollar amount suffices to express the
community’s moral condemnation.240 These examples show, in
Solomon’s words previously quoted, that the political power of the
jury is “unusually high” in tort cases241 even though we more readily
relate to the criminal jury as a political institution.242
deliberation on punitive damages irrationally inflated, sometimes dramatically, amounts
awarded above the median amount individuals favored prior to deliberation. Id. at 1140-41.
The authors could find no reasoned basis for this inflationary effect of deliberation and
attributed it to a rhetorical dynamic that upped the ante, so to speak, among jurors who
individually came into discussion favoring some punitive damages. Among such individuals,
the rhetorical advantage shifted to the argument that only large awards delivered the
intended punishment. Id. at 1161. Although the authors did not set out to study whether
diversity might mitigate the negative effects of deliberation on consistency of awards, they did
note that “moral judgments about personal injury cases are very widely shared over diverse
communities and demographic categories.” Id. at 1173. Surprisingly, even “shared moral
judgments do not produce predictable dollar awards.” Id.
237. See, e.g., Solomon, supra note 33, at 1380 (“[A] formulation and application of a norm
in a particular case ... is a decision by a particular jury that could be contradicted by a
different jury in the next courtroom on quite similar facts involving the very same de-
fendant.”).
238. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
239. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmts. h-i (1964).
240. Diamond & Rose, supra note 155, at 264 (“Punitive damages ... aim at punishing
conduct that is highly egregious and not part of acceptable business practice.”).
241. Solomon, supra note 33, at 1335.
242. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968). One reason that the civil jury is
a less visible political institution is that about 75% of all civil trials are tort cases and of those,
about two-thirds involve automobile accidents or premises liability. See Devine et al., supra
note 95, at 702; see also Hannaford et al., supra note 98, at 641 (describing a sample of 172
cases in Arizona, in which there were 73 automobile tort cases, 20 premises liability cases,
8 medical malpractice cases, 10 products liability cases, 26 miscellaneous tort cases, 22
contract cases, and 13 “other” or “unknown” cases). One can doubt that “the[se] kinds of issues
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If the civil jury is to discharge the political function of bringing
community norms to bear on the law that governs daily transac-
tions, then at least the following must be true. First, there must be
“community” norms to represent. Jason Solomon and others have
raised doubts about whether the jury is “backstopped” any longer by
a community in the normative sense.243 Second, the jury must have
the democratic credentials and knowledge to discover and to
represent the community’s norms, assuming they are there to be
found. Here too Solomon has raised questions about whether juries
have the needed democratic pedigree or knowledge.244 Third, the
jury functions well as a democratic institution only if it finds and
applies those norms consistently.
In this Article, I pursue only the issue of inconsistent verdicts,
leaving aside for another day the arguments Solomon and others
have made about other difficulties facing the civil jury as a political
institution. I single out inconsistency because it is the issue most
problematic for Gerken. 
... [are] the ones that are most important for citizens to be engaged in,” Solomon, supra note
33, at 1381, especially compared to the important issues of self-governance that juries dealt
with at the time of the Founding, including setting land-use policy and collecting taxes. Id. 
243. Paul Carrington has argued that 
any contemporary assessment of the [civil] jury ought take account of the reality
that “community” in America is a pale imitation of the social condition that gave
rise to the ... jury ... and [that] the conception of a verdict as an expression of
community morality is simply in most places quaint.
Paul D. Carrington, The Seventh Amendment: Some Bicentennial Reflections, 1990 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 33, 42. Solomon makes a similar point regarding the contemporary vitality of the
ideal of “local self-rule” that historically made the jury a valued democratic institution. He
notes that jury selection is based on a geography that makes the county the relevant
community for self-governance but he doubts that there is much descriptive reality or
normative appeal anymore to leaving counties free to govern themselves according to “local”
standards about drunk driving, product safety, and medical malpractice. Not only are norms
in these contexts unlikely to be local but practically speaking, to take one example,
“manufacturers cannot make different product designs and tailor different warnings to
different counties.” Solomon, supra note 33, at 1379-80.
244. Solomon points out that juries are often rather unrepresentative of the community and
that elected or even appointed judges might have competing credentials to represent the
community. Solomon, supra note 33, at 1359-61. He also raises questions about the supposed
“epistemic” advantage jurors have through local knowledge about what a community’s norms
are. For example, though medical malpractice lawsuits do turn on normative inquiry into
standards of care, lay jurors seldom have any particular knowledge about those standards.
Id. at 1384-85. 
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Gerken sets out to defend variation in verdicts as helping, rather
than hindering, the jury’s discharge of its political functions. But
she is not committed to defending verdict variation in all its forms.
She has in mind a particular sort of variation tied to differences in
jury composition. If and when we find out that verdict differences
correlate with differences in the group composition of juries, we
have stumbled upon something important about the state of our
democracy.245
Conceivably, second-order diversity has greater effects on
criminal cases than civil trials. On the criminal side, a paradigmatic
case of variation is the saga of the trials of four white Los Angeles
police officers accused of beating Rodney King, an African-American
suspect. When a change of venue moved the trial in 1992 to a mostly
white county, and a jury there without any African-American
members failed to convict the officers on any charges, commentators
wondered whether the verdict would have been the same had the
change of venue been denied and the officers tried before a multi-
racial jury in Los Angeles.246 A partial answer to the query came in
a subsequent federal trial, when a multi-racial jury convicted some
of the same officers on civil rights charges stemming from the same
incident.247
Similar concerns about demographic composition certainly arise
on the civil side.248 For instance, a study of jury selection in over 300
trials in Cook County showed that the most significant predictors of
which jurors would be peremptorily challenged “were whether the
juror was black or female and his or her socioeconomic status.”249
But I suggest that the paradigmatic case of civil jury variation is
about individual idiosyncrasies rather than group identities. For
instance, in the Schkade study’s critique of civil jury inconsistency,
the authors found that little of the variation could be attributed to
factors such as geography, race, gender, education, age, or wealth.
Instead, “[d]ifferent demographic groups ... produced very similar
245. Gerken, supra note 1, at 1161, 1173.
246. See, e.g., ABRAMSON, supra note 14, at 20.
247. Id. For a summary statement of this concern, see King, supra note 11, at 63-64. 
248. See infra Part IV.A for a detailed discussion of one case raising these concerns.
249. Diamond et al., supra note 44, at 440; see also Rose & Vidmar, supra note 68
(explaining the rise of the phrase “Bronx jury” to describe the supposed pro-plaintiff views of
minority jurors in civil cases).
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average evaluations.”250 The authors specially noted that moral
judgments about accidents are widely shared across groups and that
one would not expect second-order diversity therefore to be the
explanation for variations in verdicts.251 Instead, even when jurors
shared normative moral judgments, they varied erratically in how
to express those judgments in dollar terms.252
The paradigmatic case of civil jury inconsistency is two juries
with similar group compositions rendering different verdicts in two
pain and suffering cases that seem similar in their facts. In one
case, the most persuasive juror turns out to be a person whose
brother suffered tremendous pain after an automobile accident due
to soft tissue damage but who was considered a malingerer since the
accident left no visible injuries. But from the same jury pool, the
same day, a juror with such views is absent and the most persuasive
juror turns out to be someone committed to the view that people file
false claims after automobile accidents.253
 As to cases such as these, their unpredictability offers little of
Gerken’s democratic benefits, since outcomes hinge on purely
personal differences among jurors that “don’t arise from their defin-
ing group commitments” or from a distinctive world view accompa-
nying group identity.254
Is the problem of variation in civil cases different than it is in
criminal juries when it comes to jury composition and the alleged
benefits of living with different groups taking turns having the
power to control outcomes? Gerken’s attitude here is experimental:
jury trials are like “little laboratories” running all the time, and we
will find out, in the aggregate, “which group divisions ‘matter’ for
the purposes of composing the jury [and whether] the nature of the
case—civil versus criminal ...—affect[s] how th[o]se divisions play
out.”255 In other words, we will find out whether variation in civil
jury verdicts is democratically informative or whether it is just
picking up noise.
250. Schkade et al., supra note 2, at 1156.
251. Id. 
252. Id.
253. I have adapted this example from Ellis & Diamond, supra note 13, at 1035.
254. Kahan et al., supra note 43, at 886.
255. Gerken, supra note 1, at 1176, 1173.
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In that experimental spirit, I compare two civil trials. The first
was an attempt to use the civil jury to set norms for police use of
force during car chases. The second was an attempt to use the jury
to resolve the allegations of hundreds, perhaps thousands, of
hemophiliacs that they had contracted HIV on account of the
defendant pharmaceutical companies’ negligence in screening blood-
clotting solids they supplied the hemophiliac population. Interest-
ingly, courts in both cases resisted the civil jury’s role, partly from
fear that jury verdicts would introduce too much inconsistency into
areas that needed uniform and predictable results. 
A. Scott v. Harris: Diverse Attitudes Toward the Police
Norms governing police behavior are set by many institutions:
police departments, civilian review boards, elected officials, judges,
and—somewhat surprisingly—juries. For instance, pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiffs can seek jury trials, and damage awards,
to redress violations of their Fourth Amendment right to be free
from “unreasonable” searches and seizures.
A well-studied Supreme Court case raises fundamental issues
about civil jury decision making in these sorts of civil liberties cases.
In Scott v. Harris, the plaintiff was injured and left a permanent
quadriplegic following a high-speed car chase.256 The chase ended
when the pursuing police officer used his bumper to push the
driver’s car off the road, causing it to crash. The police maneuver
effectively constituted a “seizure” for Fourth Amendment purposes
and the plaintiff alleged his constitutional right against an “unrea-
sonable” seizure was violated by what amounted to a decision to use
potentially deadly force to terminate a car chase. The entire episode
was videotaped and the videotape was entered into evidence.257
The Supreme Court found the defendant entitled to summary
judgment after viewing the videotape and finding that no “reason-
able jury” could view the videotape and think the facts supported
plaintiff ’s allegations of excessive force.258 In the words of the Court,
256. 550 U.S. 372, 375 (2007).
257. Id. at 374-81.
258. Id. at 380. For a collection of cases in which courts have used the “no reasonable jury”
standard to reverse jury verdicts, see Dooley, supra note 156, at 340 n.66.
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the videotape “speak[s] for itself” in showing that the plaintiff
initiated the episode by fleeing police at speeds exceeding eighty-five
miles per hour down two-lane roads, and by evading a police trap by
colliding with a pursuing police car in a parking lot, and speeding
off again.259 The videotape captures, for any reasonable viewer the
Court maintained, a “frightening” car chase that posed an actual
and imminent threat to the lives of any pedestrians who might have
been present, to other civilian motorists, and to the officers involved
in the chase.260 Because there could be no “genuine dispute as to
those facts” for a jury to decide,261 the Court ruled as a matter of law
that “[a] police officer’s attempt to terminate a dangerous high-
speed car chase that threatens the lives of innocent bystanders does
not violate the Fourth Amendment, even when it places the fleeing
motorist at risk of serious injury or death.”262
Concurring, Justice Breyer urged interested readers to view the
videotape of the car chase, posted for a time on the Court’s web site,
and to judge for themselves why no “reasonable jury” could have
found the police used excessive force.263 Dan Kahan and a group of
researchers took up this invitation by showing the footage to a
diverse national sample of about 1350 Americans.264 Contrary to the
Court’s decision, the study showed that the videotape did not “speak
for itself,” but said different things to different viewers.265 Though
a “very sizable majority” of the sample saw what the Court saw, a
minority perceived a chase in which the dangers to the public were
not great enough to justify the use of deadly force.266 Those dissent-
ing were not a random collection of individuals but “were connected
by a core of identity-defining characteristics.”267 For instance,
259. Id. at 378-79 & n.5.
260. Id. at 380.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 386.
263. Id. at 387 (Breyer, J., concurring).
264. Kahan et al., supra note 43, at 854. 
265. Id. at 864-69. The Kahan study might be compared to what actually happened in the
trial of the police officers accused of beating Rodney King. See supra text accompanying notes
246-47. That episode had been videotaped and widely televised prior to trial. A vast majority
of persons who saw the footage thought the police were guilty, but at actual trial, the footage
was shown in slow motion, and the jury concluded that it saw a dangerous suspect never quite
under police control during the entire episode.
266. Kahan et al., supra note 43, at 879.
267. Id.
790 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:739
African-Americans and women tended to see the facts in a more pro-
plaintiff direction. So did low-income workers, residents of the
Northeast, and individuals who characterized themselves as liberals
and Democrats.268
In essence, the authors found that the cognitive processes we
bring to bear on fact perception are often value-laden.269 Thus,
people who shared a cultural orientation that values hierarchical
relations and disapproves challenges to authority were likely to see
the tape as the Court saw it. Their factual perceptions were filtered
through their individualistic world view in which the driver’s
culpability in speeding and fleeing the police was a core norm (“He
got what he deserved”). By contrast, people whose cultural profile
was marked by egalitarian norms were more likely to see a tape in
which the police abused their power (they could have aborted the
search rather than resorting to deadly force).270
The Court’s granting of summary judgment certainly maximized
the uniformity of norms governing the use of deadly force during car
chases.271 Indeed, the Court concluded its opinion by announcing a
“per se” rule that made it “objectively reasonable” for the police to
use deadly force to terminate any high-speed chase creating dangers
to the public.272 But the Kahan study showed that the Court was
simply preferring the cognitive processing of the facts of one
“cultural type” personality over those of others. Granting summary
judgment was tantamount to saying that the views of certain
subcommunities were simply “unreasonable.”273
Gerken could certainly invoke the Kahan study as support for the
variation from jury to jury that second-order diversity gives us.
Because a “very sizable majority” held to a cultural worldview that
saw the police acting reasonably, the divergent views of the minority
would be lost or subordinated to the majority faction on cross-
sectional juries that ultimately tip toward the median juror. 
268. Id. at 841.
269. Id. at 879-80.
270. Id.
271. The Court did not use the term “second-order diversity,” but it does not seem a stretch
to read into the Court’s decision a concern that the constitutional standard governing police
use of force might vary from community to community. 
272. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 386 (2007).
273. Kahan et al., supra note 43, at 881.
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But Gerken may be too quick to view the position of minorities on
juries through the simple lens of domination and subordination. As
in elections, there is such a thing as “loser’s consent” in a democ-
racy: verdicts, like elections, can have democratic legitimacy for the
losing side so long as the procedure for making the decision gives
fair hearing to the competing views of citizens.274 The Court’s
granting of summary judgment short-circuited the democratic
process by denying dissenting communities a role in the process at
all. Though Gerken, as opposed to the Court, favors leaving these
decisions to juries, she thinks cross-sectional juries are dismissive
of minorities in their own ways.
The question of whether groups can better resolve normative
disputes about police use of force through a system of second-order
diverse juries or a system making most juries first-order diverse is
not a question the authors of the Kahan study set out to answer.275
Still, it is worth noting the many places where they refer to cross-
sectionality as a core credential that gives democratic and moral
legitimacy to jury verdicts. Heterogeneity “afford[s] a factfinding
role to citizens from diverse subcommunities,” creating a participa-
tory space where citizens “interact[ ] with others whose understand-
ings of social reality differ from theirs ... thus learning that their
own understandings, and hence their views of the facts, are
partial.”276 This lesson—which the authors call “cognitive liberalism”
or coming to respect differences in factual perception—“might cause
jurors of diverse identities to converge on a common view of the
facts.”277 It may be, for instance, that minorities prove persuasive
because they hold their opinions about what the videotape shows
with more intensity. It may be that they exchange information that
provokes discussion about the reasonableness of the fear of being
stopped by the police.278 Factors such as intensity and information
274. Id. at 885-86 & n.144.
275. At one point, the authors do reference Gerken to suggest that “the prospect that jury
decisionmaking [on police use of force] might result in nonuniform verdicts” is not necessarily
a bad thing for democracy. Id. at 890 n.161.
276. Id. at 884-85.
277. Id.
278. See id. at 860-61.
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exchange challenge Gerken’s frequent characterization of minority
influence on cross-sectional juries as weak.279
Even if the minority view did not prevail after deliberation, there
is democratic difference between the Supreme Court’s disdain for
the civil jury’s role in setting standards for police use of force, and
the legitimacy that comes from setting those norms in a forum
where diversity of viewpoints and experiences with police were
raised and mulled over.280
For our purposes, it is instructive that Kahan and his colleagues
regarded Scott v. Harris as an exceptional civil jury case turning on
group identity factors.281 In their judgment, “most—probably the
overwhelming majority—of the cases” in which judges grant
summary judgment, after finding no genuine issues of fact for a jury
to resolve, are rightly decided.282 This is because the paradigmatic
case is one in which courts do not shut out from democratic
participation members of a group who share a “distinctive under-
standing of social reality.”283 To be sure, there will inevitably be
scattered individuals who might view the facts differently than a
court did in granting summary judgment. But so long as these
individuals are “mere outliers” and not representative of an
identifiable subcommunity, the granting of summary judgment does
not offend democratic procedure in the ways it did in Scott v.
Harris.284
In this Section, we have seen that Gerken’s categories of first-
versus second-order diversity can help illumine what is at stake in
a case setting norms for police use of force. But much of the debate
over the civil jury as a political institution turns on variations in
verdicts that may not reflect group composition issues at all. I turn
to such a case.
279. See id. at 886.
280. See id. at 904.
281. See id. at 860-62.
282. Id. at 886.
283. Id.
284. Id. (explaining that “statistical outliers are inevitable” but it is not the jury’s function
to represent them).
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B. Mass Torts: Hemophiliacs and HIV
Beginning in the 1980s, mass tort litigation thrust the civil jury
into one of its more prominent, even if shadowy, political roles.285
One close follower of mass tort litigation notes that not a single
plaintiff has asked for a bench trial of the issues,286 and a number
of companies have either settled from fear of going before juries287
or else gone into bankruptcy during or in anticipation of a jury
trial.288
Some praise the use or threat of civil jury trials to deter harmful
activities, in light of the failure of regulatory agencies to adequately
police hazards creating mass torts.289 Others see the spread of mass
tort litigation as “overdeterring socially beneficial activity by mak-
ing recovery too easy” before juries,290 who are sometimes misled by
junk science291 and who, in any case, are not equipped to resolve
even genuine issues of causation.292 For our purposes, however, the
most relevant criticism is that important economic and social
decisions—sometimes going to the very fate of entire indus-
tries—are left to the different decisions of different juries.293 This
285. See Schuck, supra note 234, at 482 (citing to examples including litigation over
asbestos, silicone gel breast implants, Agent Orange, Bendectin, and the Dalkon Shield). 
286. Id. at 490.
287. Id. at 479 (“[E]ven the credible threat of a jury trial can induce mass tort defendants
to settle before trial.”); id. at 482 (noting that most mass tort cases never go to trial but are
either dropped or settled).
288. See id. at 480. Companies that have filed for bankruptcy include almost all
manufacturers of asbestos, A. H. Robbins (Dalkon Shield), and Dow Corning (silicone gel
breast implants). See id. at 489 n.47.
289. “Weaknesses in the FDA's regulatory process ... contributed to the incidence of mass
injuries. For example, medical devices, which until 1976 were not subject to FDA review, are
well represented in mass tort litigation.” RAND CORP., UNDERSTANDING MASS PERSONAL
INJURY LITIGATION (2013), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9021/
index1.html; see also Peter H. Schuck, Mass Torts: An Institutional Evolutionist Perspective,
80 CORNELL L. REV. 941, 952 (1995) (noting the absence of or delayed regulatory action on
asbestos, the Dalkon Shield, DES, Agent Orange, auto safety, and tobacco).
290. Robert G. Bone, Statistical Adjudication: Rights, Justice, and Utility in a World of
Process Scarcity, 46 VAND. L. REV. 561, 596 (1993).
291. Schuck, supra note 289, at 942 (noting that juries may be misled by “easily
manipulated scientific evidence”).
292. Schuck, supra note 234, at 500-02.
293. See id. at 485 (“[V]ariability in outcomes for cases that appear similar on their facts
... should trouble any system of justice that aspires to rationality, fairness, and
predictability.”).
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strikes many as a poor way to set important public policies,
especially because jurors are rarely obliged to disclose their
reasoning on crucial issues about negligence or causation.294 Peter
Schuck notes that, in silicone gel breast implant litigation, most
juries ruled in favor of the defendants, but even a string of defense
victories was interrupted by some juries awarding large damages to
some plaintiffs.295 He cites Judge Jack Weinstein as observing
similar outcome variations in asbestos claims filed by former
workers at the Brooklyn Navy Yard.296 No obvious factual or legal
differences explained the variations in verdicts.297
In the face of this unpredictability, plaintiffs and defendants
jockey for strategic advantage.298 Defendants especially have
economic incentives to avoid jury trials altogether. Winning most
cases is not enough when losing even one or a few can threaten
them with bankruptcy.299 The logic of their position is thus to
“prefer[ ] even a bad settlement” to the risk of “not merely ... an
adverse outcome, but ... a truly catastrophic one.”300
I take it that Gerken is not committed to defending this sort of
variation in verdicts, at least absent a pattern that informs us of
important differences in the way subcommunities respond to mass
torts. In fact, her categories help us understand what is so bother-
some about some variations in verdicts. Suppose, for instance, that
the best predictor of how any given jury decides a mass tort case is
294. See Patrick Woolley, Mass Tort Litigation and the Seventh Amendment Reexamination
Clause, 83 IOWA L. REV. 499, 527-28 (1998).
295. Schuck, supra note 234, at 484-85.
296. Id. at 484.
297. Id.  Of course, as my colleague Professor Patrick Woolley commented in response to
an earlier draft of this Article, the problem of variation in verdicts is hardly unique to jury
trials. Judges in bench trials might well decide the same case differently. Email from Patrick
Woolley, Professor of Law, Univ. of Texas Sch. of Law, to author (Nov. 16, 2013) (on file with
author).
298. Schuck, supra note 234, at 483-87.
299. See id. at 484-85.
300. Id. at 485. While agreeing that mass tort litigation may threaten defendants with
severe economic consequences, Patrick Woolley notes the many strategic advantages
defendants enjoy during the course of litigation. These typically include not only better
financing and information but also rules of estoppel that move defendants to settle strong
cases, even at a premium, and to litigate comparatively weak cases first. See email from
Patrick Woolley, Professor of Law, Univ. of Texas Sch. of Law, to author, supra note 297.
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the skill of the plaintiff ’s attorney.301 That would mean even two
first-order diverse juries behave idiosyncratically and that the so-
called median juror position is itself unpredictable and erratic. This
sort of variation is far removed from the diversity of verdicts
attributable to diversity in jury composition that Gerken means to
defend. A considerable benefit of Gerken’s categories is that they let
us distinguish the variation in the way persons from different
subcommunities viewed the car chase videotape in the Kahan study
from the variation in lawyering skill that might explain why two
juries that “look like the community,” and hence are similarly
composed, reach different verdicts in cases about silicone gel breast
implants. 
In mass tort litigation, courts sometimes seek to lessen variation
by certifying plaintiffs as a class entitled to have all, or only parts,
of their common claims decided before one jury.302 But this method
may heat up opposition to the civil jury because class actions take
litigants out of the frying pan—where they are exposed to different
juries reaching different verdicts—only to put them in the oven,
where they are exposed to one jury controlling thousands of
claims.303 Chief Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit is a principal
spokesperson for the view that use of class actions in mass tort
litigation comes close to being a form of legal blackmail that forces
defendants to settle even in circumstances in which they have no
legal liability.304 And though he notes that this sort of thing “can
happen in our system of civil justice ... without violating anyone’s
legal rights,”305 he has argued for his own version of how best to take
advantage of the second-order design of our jury system, even while
limiting some of the variations that Gerken might find democrati-
cally valuable (but that Judge Posner finds economically irrational). 
Consider, for instance, claims brought on behalf of hemophiliac
patients who contracted the HIV virus after receiving contaminated
301. Schuck suggests that differences in plaintiff attorney skill may well explain some
observed variations in outcomes. Schuck, supra note 234, at 485. The same is true in criminal
trials. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 398-99 (2000) (overturning conviction due to
ineffective assistance).
302. Schuck, supra note 234, at 495.
303. See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir. 1995).
304. Id. at 1299.
305. Id. at 1300.
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blood-clotting solids supplied by the defendant pharmaceutical
companies.306 The trial judge had certified the plaintiffs as an issue
class for the purpose of litigating in one trial the common issue of
defendants’ negligence.307 Judge Posner, however, decertified the
class, finding a better “alternative exists of submitting [the matter]
to multiple juries constituting in the aggregate a much larger and
more diverse sample of decision makers.”308 As opposed to a unitary
class action, Judge Posner preferred leaving the question of whether
defendants had committed a mass tort against the hemophiliac
population to “a decentralized process of multiple trials, involving
different juries, and different standards of liability, in different
jurisdictions.”309
Of course, with multiple trials we are back to the costs of living
with variation from one jury trial to the next; the defendants will
win some and lose some. Over many cases, though, a pattern will
result that “reflect[s] a consensus, or at least a pooling of judgment,
of many different tribunals.”310
The phrase “pooling of judgment” is interesting and very un-
Gerken like. For Gerken, the merit of second-order diverse designs
is that they do not always reflect a consensus or “pooling of
judgments”—they sometimes let a particular jury shake things up
by taking an outlier position. Judge Posner did not use terms such
as first- or second-order diversity, so it is difficult to know how much
he factored into his analysis the risk of drawing an outlier jury. But
he noted that some information already existed about how juries
were responding to the hemophiliac claims. Of the 300 lawsuits
pending against the defendants, thirteen had already gone to trial
306. See id. at 1296.
307. Id. at 1297. The trial judge had in mind a bifurcated procedure, allowable under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). The issue class would resolve the issue of defendants’ liability. If
defendants were found liable, then individual plaintiffs could pursue individual claims in
subsequent trials before different juries. Evidence of comparative negligence could defeat or
lessen any one plaintiff ’s claim, as could evidence that the defendant’s negligence was not the
proximate cause of the plaintiff ’s injuries. Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1296-97, 1303.
308. Id. at 1300, 1304.
309. Id. at 1299. For another procedure, known as “stratified sampling,” that was
attempted but disallowed in the course of asbestos litigation, see Cimino v. Raymark Indus.,
751 F. Supp. 649, 653, 657, 659-67 (E.D. Tex. 1990), rev’d, 151 F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 1998); see
also Bone, supra note 290, at 595-96. 
310. Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1299-1300.
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and the defendants had won twelve.311 Judge Posner was well aware
that thirteen cases that happen to have gone to trial first were not
necessarily a representative sample, but he regarded the figures as
giving the parties some basis on which to calculate how they were
likely to fare overall in the 300 pending cases.312 In fact, he extrapo-
lated to an estimate that plaintiffs were on track to win 25 of the
300 cases.313
Judge Posner acknowledged that this estimate was rough.314 But
his point seemed to be that parties can make rational litigation
choices, despite the likely differences among jury verdicts. By
contrast, a class action lawsuit amounted to the aforementioned
legal blackmail or a crap shoot in which all bets would be off.315
It is interesting to see how differently Judge Posner and Heather
Gerken factor second-order diversity into their attitudes toward the
jury. For Gerken, the merit of second-order diversity is that it
deprives majority groups from being able to count on the jury
system to shore up their dominance.316 For Judge Posner, the
unitary class action is sometimes a far larger threat to stability of
expectations and economic rationality than having to live with
second-order diversity. Second-order diversity is almost a cost of
doing business, especially when a pattern of favorable prior
decisions cabins the effects of even a few outlier verdicts.317
311. One of the problems that plaintiffs faced was that many of them contracted the HIV
virus before the existence of the virus was widely known. To get around this issue, they
proposed a novel theory of liability. Had the defendants used reasonable care to screen their
blood solids for the known risk of Hepatitis B, they would have “serendipitously” been
screening early on for the HIV virus. Id. at 1296.
312. Id. at 1298.
313. Id.
314. Id. To the extent the defendants avoided going to trial early in the cases strongest for
the plaintiffs, their record in winning early rounds of comparatively weak cases provides little
basis for extrapolating as to how many future cases plaintiffs might yet win. I owe this
observation to Professor Woolley. See email from Patrick Woolley, Professor of Law, Univ. of
Texas Sch. of Law, to author, supra note 297.
315. Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1298-99.
316. See, e.g., Gerken, supra note 1, at 1104 (favorably regarding second-order diversity
design’s contribution to “destabilizing” existing hierarchies).
317. For instance, Judge Posner compares his estimate that the defendants’ then current
won/lost ratio extrapolates to a potential liability of “perhaps no more than $125 million” to
the potential of a class action to expose defendants to “$25 billion ... (and conceivably more)
and with it bankruptcy.” Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1298. 
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This brief review of mass tort litigation illustrates one other
issue. For Gerken, a chief democratic benefit of second-order
diversity is the opportunity it gives to dissenting groups to publicize
their views by controlling some subset of verdicts.318 But the benefit
is difficult to make out in mass tort trials, even though variation in
verdicts is abundant. The problem is the benefit matures only in the
light of day, only if the verdict makes “visible” what different groups
think about corporate responsibilities to mass tort victims. That
visibility, however, is lacking; we rarely get to peek inside the black
box and see what is going on.319 Perhaps further research will clarify
whether important political messages are being sent when juries
differ in their reactions to plaintiffs bringing mass tort lawsuits.320
But a theory that crucially depends on verdicts as message senders
is hard to fit with the overall design of the system to hide what goes
on inside the jury room. No jury has to publish its reasoning;321
indeed, there is no requirement that jurors even agree on their
reasons.322 If juries are the “little laboratories” that Gerken
considers them to be, running all sorts of democratic experiments by
varying jury composition, the test results from mass tort litigation
remain unclear.323
CONCLUSION
Throughout Second-Order Diversity, Gerken contrasts the “polit-
ical” and “truth-finding” functions of the jury.324 The traditional
318. Gerken, supra note 1, at 1104.
319. See id. at 1183.
320. Research to date casts doubt on whether second-order diversity explains incon-
sistencies in many tort cases. See, e.g., Schkade et al., supra note 2, at 1173 (noting that
“moral judgments about personal injury cases are very widely shared over diverse
communities and demographic categories” and yet verdicts vary); see also Diamond et al.,
supra note 43, at 306 (noting that background characteristics of jurors explain only a small
percentage of the observed variations in verdicts in a mock asbestos trial). 
321. Jason Solomon has argued that juries do not fit the ideals of deliberative democracy
precisely because they never have to state publicly the reasoning behind their verdicts.
Solomon, supra note 33, at 1365-66.
322. Woolley, supra note 294, at 529-30.
323. For suggestions that interrogatories and special verdicts could clarify the reasoning
behind verdicts, see id. at 542. But requiring answers to detailed interrogatories could prevent
a jury from reaching a verdict. See id. at 531. 
324. Gerken, supra note 1, at 1136 n.97 (“[W]e tend to resist the notion that juries
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emphasis on the jury as neutral truth-finder, she argues, stands in
the way of embracing the contributions the jury makes to disbursing
the “editorial” power to say what the correct verdict under law is in
a particular case.325 
Gerken’s views are in line with those who question whether there
is any independent or external standard of truth or accuracy or
justice against which to measure much of what juries do. As the
philosopher Jon Elster puts it about civil damage awards in part-
icular, “there is not even an independent criterion for the correct
outcome.”326 The same could be said about capital death sentencing:
although we have a sense of fair procedures that juries should follow
in choosing between life and death, we do not know which choice is
the “right” one to make.327
For Gerken, every jury verdict, one by one, is a political act
precisely because there is no static truth out there for juries to find
and no law mechanically to apply; there is only a democratically
constructed justice that emerges when different groups take turns
editing the law from their partial perspectives.328
There is much to recommend Gerken’s strong views on the jury
as a political institution. Even after a decade, Second-Order
Diversity remains a fresh and brilliant conceptual analysis of the
different senses in which we use the term “diversity” when trying to
describe the democratic theory the jury is designed to live out. I
have argued, however, that her contrast between the jury’s political
and adjudicative functions is too stark. I am inclined to agree with
the gist of what I believe to be John Rawls’s only reference to juries
in A Theory of Justice. For Rawls, trials are best understood as
examples of “imperfect procedural justice”: there is an external
standard of what counts as the correct verdict, but no procedure is
so perfect as to guarantee the right result.329 If there did exist such
a perfect procedure for reaching just results, we should do away
represent a strategy for diffusing power rather than for finding truth.”).
325. “[T]he suggestion that juries are editing rather than merely applying [legislated]
mandates runs counter to the role we expect juries to play within the system.” Id.
326. ELSTER, supra note 11, at 17.
327. See, e.g., Jeffrey Abramson, Death-Is-Different Jurisprudence and the Role of the
Capital Jury, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 117, 161-63 (2004).
328. See Gerken, supra note 1, at 1126-27.
329. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 74-75 (Harvard University Press rev. ed. 1999). 
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with the jury system posthaste and use the alternative.330 But in the
absence of what Rawls calls “perfect procedural justice,” we rely on
the procedures of jury trial, imperfect though they be.331
Of course, there are cases, and there are cases. In some instances,
there does not seem to be an external standard of the sort Rawls
imagines. For instance, we have no litmus paper to test when a
given act turns from the lighter color of manslaughter to the darker
color of murder. And we have no objective measure for what makes
a manufacturer liable for a product design that creates risks beyond
those an “ordinary consumer” with “ordinary knowledge” would
already know about. Still, this does not mean that there is not a
“truth” in regard to whether the manufacturer deliberately sup-
pressed in-house reports of hidden dangers or whether DNA
exonerates an accused.
Gerken offers a global endorsement of the political nature of jury
decision making when a more qualified assessment is called for. She
illumines the many instances in which juries edit according to
norms that may or may not be shared among groups. But she tends
to sweep all of the jury’s functions into the editorial/political
category, with little room left for anything but political behavior in
the jury room. I am inclined to believe, although here I speculate,
that Gerken views the jury as one example among many showing
that nothing is ever quite as beyond politics as it seems.
In this regard, let me revisit the Kahan study of the effects of
group identity on reactions to a videotaped car chase.332 The authors
330. “There is no general test for the accuracy of criminal convictions. If there were, we
would use it at trial.” Samuel R. Gross, Convicting the Innocent, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI.
173, 175 (2008).
331. As Rawls explains:
The desired outcome is that the defendant should be declared guilty if and only
if he has committed the offense with which he is charged. The trial procedure is
framed to search for and to establish the truth in this regard. But it seems
impossible to design the legal rules so that they always lead to the correct result.
The theory of trials examines which procedures and rules of evidence, and the
like, are best calculated to achieve this purpose consistent with the other ends
of the law. Different arrangements for hearing cases may reasonably be expected
in different circumstances to yield the right results, not always but at least most
of the time.
RAWLS, supra note 329, at 74-75. But see ELSTER, supra note 11, at 17-18 for an alternative
application of Rawls’ theory of justice to juries.
332. See supra Part IV.A.
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maintained that differences in background affected not only the
evaluation of facts, but also the sheer act of perception.333 This
conclusion should be questioned. To be sure, members of subcom-
munities differed on the ultimate value-laden issue of whether the
police used excessive force.334 But the differences were not over what
speed the plaintiff’s car was going, whether the highway was
divided, how many minutes the chase lasted, or how many other
motorists or pedestrians were passed during the chase’s duration.
The differences were over whether even the agreed upon facts
constituted a sufficient “danger” to justify the police decision to end
the chase with potentially deadly force.335 The authors tended to
regard the issue of whether the videotape showed a “dangerous”
chase to be a factual perception issue, but it seems better to regard
it as a mixed question of fact and law, going to whether the danger
“seen” was great enough to make the police use of deadly force
reasonable.
It is the mixed fact/law nature of so many jury inquiries that
makes Gerken’s rejection of the “jury is merely mechanically
applying the law” in favor of the “jury is a political editor of the law”
a powerful and welcome revisionist account. But revisions work best
when they salvage something from what they overthrow.
I have argued for salvaging some role for the jury to play as a
truth-finding body. Rawls expresses his claim about the truth in
jury verdicts carefully. He does not say the ideal end is for juries
always to get it right but rather that we design trial procedures to
minimize erroneous convictions or lessen incorrect findings of
liability.336 We put the burden on the state in criminal trials and on
plaintiffs in civil trials to underscore the importance of getting it
right in this regard.337
333. See Kahan et al., supra note 43, at 860-61.
334. Id. at 903.
335. Id.
336. See RAWLS, supra note 329.
337. The burden of proof, of course, is higher in criminal than in civil trials: “beyond a
reasonable doubt” versus “preponderance of the evidence,” typically, but sometimes “clear and
convincing proof.” The difference speaks to the greater importance we attach to error
minimization on the criminal side. Even in civil trials, however, the burden rests on a
normative preference to distribute errors so as to live with more false no liability findings
than more false liability findings. How much error we are prepared to live with, and how best
to distribute it, are open questions. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 269-72 (1970)
802 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:739
Alongside evidentiary procedures, jury selection procedures are
designed to promote accuracy in verdicts. For all their differences,
theorists of first- and second-order diversity agree that we rely on
the principle of random selection as the best method for stripping
government of the power to bias outcomes by biasing who gets on
juries.338 This is an important negative contribution to truth-finding.
Even if we do not know in a positive sense what the right result is
or who the right people are to find it, we do know that bias can seep
into results when government is left free to select or to excuse jurors
in a discriminatory fashion. As the Supreme Court suggested as far
back as 1880, when government restricts jury duty to whites, it has
already signaled to a jury so chosen how it should decide the guilt
of a black defendant.339 
Advocates of first- and second-order diversity are split over the
issue of whether jury composition contributes to the accuracy and
impartiality of verdicts in a positive sense. Gerken concludes that
minority representation on individual juries does little to alleviate
the strong “social-psychological” pressure that favors majority
control.340 This is why she can view all jury verdicts, considered one
by one, as partial and political. But I have suggested, after review-
ing the empirical literature on deliberation, two ways in which
diversity serves the truth-telling functions of individual juries.
First, in an epistemic sense, heterogeneous juries outperform homo-
geneous juries in exchanging information and perspectives on the
evidence, compiling better records when it comes to catching
mistakes, filling in blanks, and checking one another’s partialities.
The epistemic advantage translates into reason-giving argument,
which makes deliberation on cross-sectional juries more dynamic
and transformative of preexisting preferences than it is on homoge-
neous panels. Second, in a democratic sense, the cross-sectional jury
enjoys a legitimacy-giving advantage. Juries that “look like” the
community have a special claim to stand in for the community, by
virtue of their inclusiveness.
(Harlan, J., concurring).
338. Richard Re calls this assuring “institutional impartiality” in our jury selection
procedures. See Re, supra note 35, at 1586-88.
339. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 309-10 (1879).
340. See Gerken, supra note 1, at 1125-26.
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Though the legitimacy and accuracy of jury verdicts are two
different matters, the two tend to come together in the cross-
sectional jury. The very credential that legitimizes a jury’s
verdict—its visibility as a representative of the whole commu-
nity—is the same credential that adds impartiality to a jury’s
deliberations. To be sure, that impartiality is diffuse—a product of
many minds. But the fact that it takes many minds to approach
impartiality is not an argument against the cross-sectional jury as
a truth-telling body. It is the definitive argument in favor of
diversity on juries. It is also the definitive argument in favor of the
jury system as a whole: our oldest standing institution built on the
proposition that twelve persons achieve a wisdom in common, no
person has alone.
